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For the past twenty years, the United States has been at war. Yet, while invocations of war often 
evoke images of soldiers on the battlefield, the war the U.S. has been fighting looks far different. 
In the past two decades, the U.S. has attempted to curb the impact of terrorist organizations’ media 
usage. This paper explores the genealogy of that media battle through a case study of al-Qaeda and 
ISIS’ media apparatuses. It argues that, often overlooked, is the role that media plays as a 
foundational element in both groups’ organizational structures. Moreover, this paper will 
demonstrate how ISIS has expounded on the success of al-Qaeda’s media strategy, thereby 
creating an online caliphate. Ultimately, this paper will conclude that new strategies and ways of 
thinking about the war on terror will need to be developed in for the U.S. to effectively combat 
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“We do not understand the movement [ISIS], and until we do, we are not going to defeat it. We 
have not defeated the idea. We do not understand the idea.”1 
-Major General Michal K. Nagata 
 
“We are in a battle,” declared Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy chief of al-Qaeda, in 2004. “We 
are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media. And 
we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our Umma.”2 Yet, just less than two 
decades after intercepting Zawahiri’s message, U.S. officials have failed to combat al-Qaeda’s 
media strategy. To continue Zawahiri’s battlefield metaphor, U.S. officials have barely even 
“deployed troops” to the media landscape. Al Qaeda has littered the internet with propaganda, but 
the U.S. has barely shot back. 
In fact, it was not until after al-Qaeda's propaganda push during the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 that counterterrorist experts began noting the potency of online terror. Al-Qaeda, and its 
Iraqi offshoot, now known as the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), changed the game 
completely. Al-Qaeda is the first guerilla movement to transform the war from an era of physical 
battles to Cyberspace. From web platforms complete with instructions on how to commit suicide 
attacks to its English-language magazine (Dabiq), al-Qaeda changed the way that terrorism and 
counterterrorism would be studied for years to come. 
To distribute their message, al-Qaeda Central Command (AQC) aptly used the Internet as 
a propaganda, recruitment, and training platform. AQC leadership quickly learned that it could 
reach a wider audience through a largely unregulated online domain. The sheer size of the AQC 
 
1 Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State of Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State,” Center for Middle East Policy at 
BROOKINGS, No. 19; (Mar 2014), 4. 




media effort itself reflects a massive push on AQC's end to use this new platform, Cyberspace, to 
its benefit. Former CIA deputy director, John E. McLauglin, went so far as to describe al-Qaeda 
as a movement fueled by “ideology and the Internet.”3 Certainly, it is impossible to understand Al-
Qaeda in the early 2000s without centralizing the role of Internet propaganda.  
Al-Qaeda’s command of the cyber-web domain set the stage for its Iraqi partner, ISIS, to 
master the next phase of the Internet revolution: social-media. Sheer numbers alone illuminate the 
proliferation of ISIS propaganda online. At the height of its Caliphate, ISIS boasted anywhere from 
46,000 to 70,000 accounts on Twitter.4 Moreover, as this paper will further explore, ISIS created 
its own physical apparatuses for the distribution of propaganda. This includes control of all 
officially distributed propaganda through a Central Media Office (Diwan al-’l’lam al-Markaz), as 
well as through dozens of non-official and provincial-level offices.5 To date, the energy that ISIS 
has contributed to constructing a wide-spread apparatus across multiple social media platforms has 
proven difficult to combat. 
Despite the high level of success of ISIS and al-Qaeda’s online propaganda, few studies 
dissect the groups’ social media strategy. Moreover, the existent studies tend to focus on ISIS’ 
interactions on Twitter and ISIS’ English-language content, leaving most of al-Qaeda and ISIS’ 
propaganda untouched. Perhaps even more concerning is the lack of research pertaining to how 
media fits into the organizational structures over the organization. This paper aims to fill these 
gaps in research by situating al-Qaeda and ISIS in context to their media empires. 
 
3 Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, “Terrorist Turn to the Web as Base of Operations,” The Washington Post. Aug 7, 
2005. 
4 J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS 
supporters on Twitter,” Brookings, Mar 5, 2015; Yet, it is important to note that some of these accounts are run by 
the same users. [See Chapter 4 for a further discussion of ISIS accounts.] 
5 Daniel L. Byman and Jennifer R. Williams, “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s Global Civil War,” The Brookings 
Institution, 24 February 2015. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-
civil-war; Bacon, Tricia, and Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault. “Al Qaeda and the Islamic State's Break: Strategic Strife 
or Lackluster Leadership?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 42, no. 3 (2019): 229–63. 
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This paper contains four main components. First, this paper will extensively detail the 
frameworks that traditional academia uses to understand al-Qaeda and ISIS. In other words, it will 
explore the groups’ religious, geopolitical, and biographical underpinnings. Secondly, this paper 
will trace the origins of al-Qaeda, beginning with the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 
and ending with the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001. Third, it will do a similar survey 
with ISIS, from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi first forming a jihadi organization in 1994 to the creation 
of an Islamic caliphate in 2014. In both its organizational purviews, this paper will make explicit 
note of the intersection of media with the formation of the two organizations. Finally, this paper 
will exhibit ISIS’ ultimate media strategy both regarding how ISIS utilizes media and how ISIS’ 
media usage impacts its success.  
Through this analysis, an abundance of factors will become clear. Media will be 
demonstrated as fundamental to the operational functionality of both al-Qaeda and ISIS. 
Additionally, ISIS’ media strategy will be revealed as not divorced from; but rather, a continuation 
of al-Qaeda’s own media strategy. Ultimately, this paper will argue that ISIS’ virtual operations 
are as fundamental to ISIS’ definition of its caliphate as its physical operations. The significance 
of such an argument is clear: with a better understanding of how al-Qaeda and ISIS conceptualize 
and weaponize their media operations, U.S. officials can more effectively wage a media war 








CHAPTER ONE: FRAMEWORKS OF REFERENCE 
“This [Clash of Civilizations] is a very clear matter, proven in the Qur’an and the traditions of the 
Prophet, and any true believer who claims to be faithful shouldn’t doubt these truths, no matter 
what anybody says about them.”6 
-  Osama Bin Laden on Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations 
 
 
 In the Summer of 1993, Samuel Huntington famously published an article in Foreign 
Affairs. It was called “The Clash of Civilizations.” In the article, Huntington argued that in the 
next stage of history, conflicts would begin to emerge between civilizations such as “the West” 
and “Islam.”7 According to Huntington, there were an abundance of political, cultural, and 
religious distinctions endemic to each civilization. 
 Reading Huntington’s argument, one could easily explain the emergence of al-Qaeda and 
its protegee, the Islamic State; both are simply outcroppings of a natural Islamic rejection to “the 
West.”  Yet, as many scholars have perceptively pointed out since the publishing of “The Clash of 
Civilizations,” there are three fundamental flaws with Huntington’s argument. First, Huntington 
ignores hundreds of years of transcontinental mixing of social movements, cultural trends, 
religious and spiritual groups, technological advancements, economic practices, and artistic 
traditions. Second, Huntington characterizes civilizations as stationary objects inside shut boxes; 
civilizations are not stagnant in time nor neat in their borders. Finally, by ignoring the diversity of 
definitions of a civilization, Huntington suppresses the true color of civilizations. In other words, 
Huntington focuses exclusively on the political histories of civilizations but fails to focus on the 
cultural or spiritual aspects. 
These arguments, alongside many other valid concerns, suggest that understanding Islam 
is not as easy as painting Islam as the antithesis to the West. On the one hand, Islam is a complex, 
 
6 Bruce Lawrence, ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, (London: Verso, 2005), 124. 
7 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49. 
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world-wide tradition. Thus, understanding al-Qaeda and ISIS as merely rejections to the West is a 
reduction of Islam. On the other hand, al-Qaeda and ISIS are not simply incarnations of Islam; 
while they claim to have Islamic roots, Islam is not the only thing that defines them. As complex 
organizations, al-Qaeda and ISIS must be understood beyond their religious claims. 
This chapter will only partially explain what Islam means, as religious traditions are only 
one small component of al-Qaeda and ISIS.  In accordance with scholarship on the topic, there are 
three levels by which this chapter will analyze the emergence of al-Qaeda and ISIS. In addition to 
reviewing the organizations’ religious roots, this chapter will explore the geopolitical contexts in 
which the groups were popularized. This chapter will then survey the key personalities that led the 
group. Through these different lenses, readers will gain a three-tiered understanding of why the al-
Qaeda and ISIS developed, grew, and separated. As this chapter will make clear, none of the 
traditional frameworks that scholars utilize to understand ISIS and al-Qaeda are sufficient.  
 
A Movement of Culture/Religious Fundamentalism 
Contextualizing Jihad 
 In some ways, the religious roots of al-Qaeda and ISIS reflect a very specific, recent trend 
in Islam. In other ways, the traditions of al-Qaeda and ISIS harken back to early Islamic history. 
In any case, the Islam of al-Qaeda and ISIS is deeply rooted in a weaponization of Islam. Yet this 
weaponization only occurs in the context of “Islam under attack.” In other words, al-Qaeda and 
ISIS derive their legitimacy from Islamic trends that attempt to push back on modern 
encroachments—political and theological. 
To explore these trends, this section will explore the doctrinal roots of al-Qaeda and ISIS 
which are, admittedly diverse. As noted by terrorist scholar, Dr. Paul Kamolnick, al-Qaeda “is not 
10 
 
exclusively Salafist, though it includes a significant number. It is not exclusively Salafi-Wahhabi 
or Wahhabi, though it also includes their number; it is not exclusively inspired by Sayyid Qutb, 
though he is recognized and honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. Qa’idat al-Jihad is rather a 
broad, transnational church-like conglomerate.”8 Dr. Kamolnick’s writing makes clear that al-
Qaeda reflects a plethora of Islamic trends, thus requiring a nuanced analysis of each. 
In order to comprehensively understand al-Qaeda and ISIS, this section will first note the 
formation of Salafism and Wahhabism as a rejection of liberal, secular statehood. This section will 
then demonstrate how the state responds to these more orthodox forms of Islam, ultimately 
producing political Islam, or Islamism. Finally, this section will explore how al-Qaeda and ISIS 
surpass their Wahhabi-Salafi Islamist roots and weaponize the conception of jihad. 
Overall, this slow, yet complex progression towards al-Qaeda and ISIS theologies will 
illuminate two important trends. First, despite claims by both organizations that their theology 
represents “true Islam,” their doctrinal interpretations will simply represent one interpretative 
tradition among many. Secondly, this section will demonstrate how al-Qaeda and ISIS utilize their 
theology as a political strategy just as equally as a religious creed. This thereby suggests that al-
Qaeda and ISIS are well-aware of the public perception of their organizations and are intentional 
in their creation of a public image. Importantly, while they will share many common religious 
roots, ISIS and al-Qaeda will differ on their theological interpretations, demonstrating their 
different political goals.   
 
8 Paul Kamolnick, The Al-Qaeda Organization and the Islamic State Organization: History, Doctrine, Modus 
Operandi, and U.S. Policy to Degrade and Defeat Terrorism Conducted in the Name of Islam, (CreateSpace 
Independent Publishing Platform, June 5th, 2017). 
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The Rise of Secularism and State-Sponsored Violence 
The development of a politicized Islam has existed since the “creation” of Islam because 
the emergence of a new system of faith inherently questioned traditional power structures. Yet, the 
modern iteration of Islam faced a major challenge after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. With the 
Ottoman Empire’s demise, a power vacuum emerged, and European countries raced to fill it.9 The 
arrival of European colonial powers brought many of their religious and philosophical traditions 
to the Middle East. Most notably, was a conception of secularism distinct to European nation-
states. European nation-states conceived of secularism as the separation of church and state.10 Yet, 
when this conception of secularism intersected with Islam, conflict ensued. As religious scholar 
Hadi Enayat makes clear, “the ‘problem’ of religion, which had seemingly been resolved by the 
secular state, [was] posed anew.”11 Secularism, as Enayat continues to argue, would struggle to be 
implemented in the new, Arab, and predominately Muslim states. 20th century Muslims were 
tasked with figuring out how Islam would be compatible with a new conception of statehood 
devoid of religion.  
In addition to secularism, the politically “modern” state came complete with the notion that 
the state has hegemony over violence. Nineteenth and twentieth conceptions of statehood 
suggested that the state could decide what type of violence was legitimate and which was 
illegitimate. Such a model follows mainly from the theories of Max Weber who argued that 
“political modernity depended upon the centralized state monopolizing violence.”12 This would 
have major implications for the Middle East. Basing much of their legal doctrine off their 
 
9 Janin Hunt. The Pursuit of Learning in the Islamic World, 610–2003. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2005). 
10 Need evidence here: Asad 2003, p.24 as quoted in Enayat: “Asad argues, it was this more anti-theistic conception 
of ‘secularism’ that was gradually co-opted by liberal elites and used to legitimize the project of political and 
cultural secularization.” 
11 Hadi Enayat. Islamism and Secularism in Post-Colonial Thought, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Introduction. 
12 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror, (New York: 
Three Leaves Press, 2004), 5. 
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colonizers’ political models, nascent Middle Eastern states began to severely repress their citizens. 
As will become clear with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islam provided the means for non-
state groups to protest state-sponsored violence. 
The Development of Salafi-Wahhabism 
There was a diversity of ways in which Muslims responded to the rise of the modern nation 
state. One of these ways was Salafism. It was around the decline of the Ottoman Empire, in the 
mid to late-19th Century, that Salafism first began to develop. At the time, Salafism was an 
intellectual movement that took place at the spiritual center of the Sunni world, al-Azhar 
University.13 Yet, as debates over statehood began in the 20th century, Salafism moved beyond 
the academic realm. Salafis contended that that as-salaf al-saliheen (the pious forebearers), 
another term for the early umma (Muslim community), best understood and practiced Islam.14 
While Salafism is now often conflated with anti-modernism, some early Salafis accepted 
modernism, such as the early Salafi Reformer, Muhammad ‘Abduh, who considered himself both 
a Salafi and an Islamic modernist.15 Some of his followers even “developed his ideas in the 
direction of secular nationalism.”16 Others “admired the technical and social advancement of 
Europe’s Enlightenment, and tried to reconcile it with the belief that their own society was the heir 
to a divinely guided Golden Age of Islam.”17 Salafism would come to have a diverse meaning, but 
at least at its origins, it welcomed modernity. 
 
13 Trevor Stanley, “Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism, Terrorism Monitor, vol.3, 14: July 15, 
2005, https://jamestown.org/program/understanding-the-origins-of-wahhabism-and-salafism/. 
14 Ibid.; Roxanne L. Euben ed. And Muhammad Qasim Zamman ed., Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts 
and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 18. 
15 Euben and Zamman ed., Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, 19. 
16 Ibid, 19. 
17 Stanley, “Understanding the Origins.” 
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Yet with the creation of Wahhabism, Salafism took a turn towards anti-imperialism. 
Wahabbism is the tradition derived from Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a Salafi who helped to 
found the modern Saudi Arabian state.18 Al-Wahhab claimed that “the decline of the Muslim world 
was caused by pernicious foreign innovations (bida’)—including European modernism, but also 
elements of traditional Islam.”19 Thus, al-Wahhab structured his movement not as solely anti-
Western but also as anti-Shi’a and anti-Sufi. Despite its rejection of European ideological trends 
and interpretations of a modern, liberal state, Wahhabism should importantly still be considered 
Salafist given that both movements share a desire to reinterpret Islam through the original texts 
and actions of the Prophet. In fact, many scholars refer to the movements as one—Salafi-
Wahhabism. Indeed, to al-Qaeda and ISIS, Salafism and Wahhabism are not distinguishable from 
one another. Nonetheless, in order to not replicate Huntington’s premise that Islamic traditions are 
inherently anti-Western or anti-modern, it is important to note that Salafism is not inherently 
incompatible with either the West nor with modernity. Falling into such reductionist conceptions 
of Islam simply plays into al-Qaeda and ISIS’ own rhetoric that the West is at war with Islam. 
 
The Foundations of Islamism 
In addition to often being described as Salafi-Wahhabist, al-Qaeda and ISIS are often 
described as Islamist. This poses the question of where Islamism fits in context to Salafism and 
Wahhabism. Indeed, all three movements are quite diverse in their interpretative iterations, making 
it difficult to distinguish between the three. 
 
18 Euben and Zamman ed., Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, 21. 




Most pertinently to how ISIS and al-Qaeda utilize Islamism, Islamism is what brings 
Salafi-Wahhab traditions into the political sphere. This paper uses the definition of Islamism 
proposed by Brookings’ scholars Shadi Hamid and Rashid Dar who write, “Islamist groups believe 
Islamic law or Islamic values should play a central role in public life. They feel Islam has things 
to say about how politics should be conducted, how the law should be applied, and how other 
people—not just themselves—should conduct themselves morally.”20 Though, like Salafi-
Wahhabists, Islamists often return to the Qur’an and Sunna (actions and words of the Prophet 
Muhammad), they do so with a specific political agenda.  
Despite what al-Qaeda and ISIS leadership may want their followers to believe, Islamism 
is a product of modernity. Hamid and Dar continue to describe this very trend. 
Islamism isn’t just a reaction to modernity, but a product of it. In the pre-modern era, Islam imbued 
every aspect of public life, providing an overarching religious, legal, and moral culture. It went 
without saying, so it wasn’t said. With the advent of modernity, Islam, for the first time, became a 
distinct political project.21 
 
Hamid and Dar’s argument reflects how, because of the introduction of secularism into the Muslim 
world, Muslims were forced to recreate a notion of statehood that included Islam. Islamism 
attempted to be this very politicization—a blend between the political and the religious. Moreover, 
Hamid and Dar rightly note that, while this blend was not novel to the Muslim world, it was 
modernity that begged for a rigidity that was formerly not required. In fact, there is no Arab word 
for the term Islamism, a reflection of the fact that Islamism is a conception for Western audiences 
to better understand the interaction between Islam and state. In any case, Islamism allows Islam—
which, by Western eyes, could be seen merely as a religion—to transcend into the political realm. 
 





Islamism in Practice: Ikhwanism 
 One of the first political iterations of Islamism, Saudi Arabia aside, was the formation of 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The first records of the MB, also referred to by its Arabic name, 
jama‘at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, date back to the 1930s in both Egypt and Syria. Their respective 
founders, Hassan al-Banna and Mustafa al-Siba’i, were good friends who studied together at Al-
Azhar in 1933. Both al-Banna and al-Siba’i were impacted by key ideological movements at the 
time: Islamic revitalization and anti-colonialism.22  
 In fact, in both Syria and Egypt, the founding branches were created as a direct counter to 
French and British conceptions of modernity. For instance, both colonial powers created 
missionary schools that taught secular curriculum and Christian values. Hasan al-Banna was 
particularly worried that not only “the missionaries’ work would inevitably pierce the Islamic soul, 
but it was also part of a wider Western conspiracy against Islam.”23 Jamiya al-Gharra was even 
established in Damascus in 1924 explicitly to “oppose French control of the Syrian education 
system.”24 Accordingly, during the 1930s and through the 1940s, both Brotherhoods took on 
religious and educational roles. As described by Patrick Seale: “Paradoxically, it was the French, 
who in 1938 caused these isolated groups to merge by insisting on discussing the then contentious 
issue of Islamic teaching in schools with a single nation-wide organization.”25 Seale’s argument 
thus suggests that missionary schools were not only the catalyst for the creation of the jami’yyat, 
but also unified the shabab muhammad against a common enemy. Among Muslims, education was 
an issue of moral values—if formal Arabic were replaced by English or French, their children 
 
22 Noha Mellor. Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood: Daʻwa, Discourse and Political Communication. Routledge, 
2018. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Dara Conduit. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. (Cambridge: Cambridge Middle East Studies, 2019). 
25 Díaz Naomí Ramírez. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria: the Democratic Option of Islamism. Routledge, 2018. 
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would be unable to read the Qur’an and would be disconnected from their faith. By exploring both 
the Syrian and Egyptian contexts, it becomes clear that this Islamist trend to oppose the 
secularization of school curriculum was a transnational struggle. 
 Yet, in both Syrian and Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood slowly began to radicalize and 
incorporate more aggressive, Salafist rhetoric in response to state-sponsored violence. In Syria, 
this was catalyzed in the 1970s when a nascent Baath regime cracked down on any opposition.26  
This led to the creation of al-Tali’a al-Muqatila lil-mujahidin (“The Fighting Vanguard of 
Warriors”), whose founder, Marwan Hadid, rejected “Western ideas, any form of compromise with 
secular movements, and any mercy for Alawis.”27 In February 1982, the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood was massacred during the infamous Hama Massacre.28 Yet, the presence of an 
Islamist group in Syria demonstrated to the entire Levant that there were those willing to stand up 
against 20th century notions of statehood and state repression. 
 In Egypt, a similar trend occurred. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Nasser regime commit 
many atrocities against the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB), including mass incarceration 
and torture.29 Nonetheless, this oppression simply led to the popularization of an EMB radical, 
Sayyid Qutb. Called by one journalist as “the Philosopher of Islamic Terror,” Qutb was a zealous 
writer who helped to popularize conceptions that modernity was characterized by jahiliyya (pagan 
ignorance, a reference to the time before the Prophet Muhammad was born).30 Qutb also 
 
26 Raphael Lefevre, “The Syrian Brotherhood’s Armed Struggle,” The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace: December 14, 2012, https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/14/syrian-brotherhood-s-armed-struggle-pub-
50380. 
27 ibid. 
28 Robert M. Danin. “Remembering the Hama Massacre,” Council on Foreign Relations (CFR): February 2, 2012, 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/remembering-hama-massacre. 
29 Barbara Zollner, “Surviving Repression: How Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Has Carried On,” Malcom H. Kerr 
Carnegie Middle East Center: March 11, 2019, https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/03/11/surviving-repression-how-
egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-has-carried-on-pub-78552. 
30 Euben and Zamman ed., Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought, 129, 131. 
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conceptualized the creation of a vanguard to fight jahiliyya.31 Both ideas would later influence 
Osama bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri. When Qutb was assassinated in 1966, he became 
a martyr for the Islamist cause. Despite continued oppression by the Sadat administration, Qutb’s 
legacy would continue to inspire the next generation of the Muslim Brotherhood to fight back 
against cultural and physical oppression by the modern state. 
Global Jihad 
 What is perhaps most theologically interesting about al-Qaeda and ISIS is that they both 
share a mix of Salafism, Wahhabism, Islamism, and “Ikhwanism” (aka Qutbism). Together, these 
ideologies have come together to form global jihadism. Though both groups emerge from the same 
traditions, ISIS and al-Qaeda both have distinct interpretations of global jihad.  
To unpack exactly what global jihadism means; however, it is important to first understand 
the root of the term jihad. In the interpretive history of Islam, it is commonly assumed that there 
are two forms of jihad. There is al-jihad al-akbar (the greater jihad) and al-jihad al-asghar (the 
lesser jihad).32 Al-jihad al-akbar refers to the struggle against one’s own weaknesses or the 
struggle to attain piety. This is not what al-Qaeda or ISIS mean when they refer to jihad. What the 
two organizations do mean is, al-jihad al-asghar, which is “about self preservation and self-
defense; directed outwardly, it is the source of Islamic notions of what Christians call ‘just war,’ 
rather than ‘holy war.’”33 
Traditionally, the lesser jihad was used sparingly; jihad as “just war” was only waged four 
times prior to the 20th century. However, as the secular conception of the modern nation-state 
encroached more and more on practicing Muslims, “just war” became ever-more relevant. In part, 
 
31 Ibid, 139. 
32 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 50. 
33 Ibid, 50. 
18 
 
Wahhabism is at the roots of this theory—the third time jihad al-asghar was invoked was by Ibn 
Wahhab and the House of Saud against the Ottomans, Shi’a, and Great Britain. Almost a century 
and a half later Sayyid Qutb would invoke jihad al-asghar to call his fellow Muslims to arms 
against the Egyptian government. In their invocation of jihad, al-Qaeda and ISIS drew from both 
the Ikhwan and Wahhabi tradition. 
However, al-Qaeda and ISIS both go beyond the Ikhwan and Wahhabis by failing to justify 
their offensive war. The Arabic word harb (offensive war) is notably distinct from jihad (defensive 
struggle); and thus, the latter can only be invoked when the umma is under attack.34 Religious 
scholar, Bruce Lawrence, describes how “bin Laden points to passages in the Qur’an that he reads 
as authorizing a generalized lex talionis (law of retaliation)...Yet such a select reading of scriptural 
sources and extra scriptural authority sits ill with the conscience of the great majority of 
contemporary Muslims.”35 As bin Laden’s biography will later make clear, bin Laden himself does 
not have the religious authority to make such claims. In his brash usage of jihad, he overstretches 
both the Wahhabi and Ikhwan tradition. 
 The other distinct component of global jihad from former traditions is, perhaps obviously, 
its global nature. In part, al-Qaeda and ISIS’ focus on global targets is not entirely new. Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood-affiliate, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salaam Faraj, wrote a fifty-four-page 
manifesto that suggested Egyptians should focus on the “near enemy,” the Egyptian regime, 
instead of on the “far enemy,” Israel.36 By the 1980s, al-Qaeda twisted Faraj’s argument, and 
argued the inverse: Muslims should focus on the “far enemy,” the West. The reasons for this will 
be argued in the following section but, notably, al-Qaeda seems to have been prompted to adopt a 
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“far enemy” strategy not because of the doctrinal roots, but rather, because it was politically 
expedient. Ironically, though ISIS emerged from al-Qaeda, ISIS would take on more of a “near 
enemy” strategy—a trend far more in line with Islamic discursive tradition. 
 In addition to its Muslim Brotherhood ties, both al-Qaeda and ISIS are distinctly Salafi. 
Both groups “emphasize the military exploits of the Salaf (early generations of Muslims) to give 
their violence an even more immediate divine imperative.”37 Both groups try to emulate the 
violence of the early umma to connect to the time of the Prophet. 
However, there is still a split between how ISIS and al-Qaeda promote their Salafism. ISIS 
is more Wahhabi than al-Qaeda because, unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS is prolific in its usage of takfir 
(Islamic excommunication). As will become clear, al-Qaeda tends to ignore the theological issue 
posed by the presence of different Islamic traditions, while ISIS fully believes that it is the duty of 
Muslims to slaughter the murtad (unbelievers). Such a debate over takfirism would come to 
dominate the two groups, and ultimately contribute to their split. 
 As earlier suggested, this section demonstrates the importance of understanding the 
doctrinal trends underlying al-Qaeda and ISIS. However, as was equally apparent from this 
section, political trends and significant figures partially shaped the religious practices that al-Qaeda 
and ISIS chose. The next two sections will survey such political trends and figures. 
 
A Global Movement 
While religion is one window into understanding the development of al-Qaeda-style 
jihadism, it is incomplete. Notably, there were key events that inspired this new wave of jihad. 
According to terrorism scholar Glenn E. Robinson, al-Qaeda-style jihadism refers to jihad on a 
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global scale. Robinson posits that there were three major catalysts that led to the rise of al-Qaeda. 
First, was the US’ “twin pillars policy”—US policies that propped up both the military power of 
the Shah’s Iran and Saudi Arabia.38 When that strategy failed in 1979, it appeared that the 
conservative, religious right in Iran had beat out the United States, emboldening conservative 
revolutionaries around the Middle East.  
Of particular humiliation to the United States was the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Iran. 
Sixty-six hostages were captured, blindfolded, and “paraded in front of the cameras.”39 The 
breaking news was broadcast throughout the world: the greatest military superpower in the world 
was embarrassed by students in a relatively weak country. Marines in charge of protecting the 
embassy had not even fired a single bullet.40 The event signaled to nascent jihadists that America 
was not as strong as it appeared.  
A second geopolitical catalyst to the rise of al-Qaeda was the seizure of the Kaaba by anti-
Saudi jihadi militants. The two-week capture was hailed as a victory by Sunni jihadi circles. The 
Kaaba is the holiest site in Islam, believed to have been built by the Prophet Ibrahim.41 As a place 
of many Islamic legends, the site is the epicenter of Mecca and the direction to which Muslims 
pray five times a day. Thus, when a Saudi extremist by the name of Juhayman al-Uteybi, rallied 
followers to take the Kaaba, the events would have a major impact on the entire Muslim World. 
On November 20, 1979 (the first day of the new Islamic year), Juhayman and his followers 
snuck into the Kaaba. At dawn, gunfire rang through the air.42 The assailants declared Juhayman’s 
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brother-in-law, Mohammad Abdullah, to be the Mahdi (a prophetic figure in Islam who is foretold 
to reappear at the end of times).43 The Saudi police, who were armed with no more than batons, 
ran for their lives, with two being shot dead.44 100,000 people were taken hostage.45 Saudi troops 
refused to enter the Kaaba, given the Islamic ordinance forbidding violence in the Kaaba under 
any circumstances.46 After three days, Saudi clerics issued a fatwa (religious decree) permitting 
the Saudi authorities to use violence to take back the grand mosque, though the Saudis first attempt 
to retake the mosque ended in bloodshed.47 By December 4th, after fifteen days of control of the 
Mosque, the Saudi government regained control of the holy site. Casualties numbered in the 
hundreds.48 
The seizure of the Kaaba had major implications for Islamists throughout the Middle East. 
For one, the event is thought to have radicalized a young Osama bin Laden, the figure who would 
later become the face of al-Qaeda.49 Often, the event is overlooked at a local incident in which 
orthodox extremists protested the Saudi regime. However, there are indications that the event had 
major implications even for those who were not Saudi nationals. The event, particularly in 
conjunction with the Islamic Revolution, marked the embarrassment of relatively secular 
governments by Islamists. This inspired many Islamists around the Arab World. “With the benefit 
of hindsight, it is painful clear: the countdown to September 11, to the terrorist bombings in 
London and Madrid, and to the grisly violence ravaging Afghanistan and Iraq all began on that 
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warm November morning, in the shade of the Kaaba,” as Yaroslav Trofimov describes in a book 
dedicated to the event.50 Notably, the event was one of the first radical acts taken by Sunni 
Islamists, bringing what began with the Shi’a revival in Iran to Sunni-Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. 
Finally, the third major catalyst for the rise of “global jihad” was the Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. The Soviet Invasion brought jihad into a global context; 
whereas the previous two events of 1979 were relatively grounded in Middle East-specific 
contexts, the Soviet Invasion opened criticism to a world order that seemed stacked against the 
average Middle Eastern citizen. As specialist on global jihad, Thomas Hegghammer, writes: 
What happened in the 1980s is still relevant because the Soviet-Afghan war is the cradle of today’s 
jihadi movement. That was where al-Qaida was born, and that there was where famous leaders such 
as Usama Bin Ladin started their militant career. The networks forged in Afghanistan became the 
backbone of the jihadi movement in the 1990s and 2000s, with former Afghan Arabs filling key roles 
in most jihadi groups. Intellectually, too, the Afghan jihad played a vital role, both as an incubator 
for key ideas and as the source environment for the jihadi subculture we know today.51 
 
Hegghammer suggests that without the Soviet-Afghan war, the modern jihadi movement today 
would look significantly different, let alone, may never have even taken shape. Hegghammer’s 
argument is compounded by a study by the Los Angeles Times which found that “the key leaders 
of every major terrorist attack, from New York to France to Saudi Arabia, inevitably turned out to 
have been veterans of the Afghan War.”52 In fact, as will be clear from the next chapters, all the 
men behind the major terrorist attacks in the 1990s were trained in Afghanistan camps that were 
remnants from the Afghan War. 
These three foundations link the rise of al-Qaeda to specific historical events, suggesting 
that al-Qaeda was born out of a specific historical context. As we will come to see, this is far 
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different from the approaches of other authors, who consider al-Qaeda and its subsidiary, ISIS, as 
products of key personalities or religious fundamentalism. 
A Personalistic Movement 
 Other scholars are more interested in linking the rise of al-Qaeda, and the split of ISIS from 
al-Qaeda, as tied to key personalities within the movements. For instance, one scholar writes, 
“Since its creation in 1988 the Al-Qaeda organization has functioned according to a complex 
system of interpersonal relationships.”53 According to this framework of analysis, these 
interpersonal relationships help to explain why terrorists are recruited and radicalized. As will 
come to be clear in this chapter, interpersonal relationships often define allegiance to a terrorist 
network. Thus, it is clear to see that when these allegiances break, it is often due to rifts in 
interpersonal relationships. 
This chapter will operate off the framework suggested by terrorism researcher Dr. Paul 
Kamolnick. Dr. Kamolnick insinuates that the different movements are driven by particular 
figures: Dr. Abdallah Azzam, Osama Bin Laden, Abu Musa’b al-Zarqawi, and Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi (to whom he prescribes the labels “Azzamism,” “Bin Ladenism,” “Zarqawism,” and 
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Left to Right: Osama bin Laden, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, and Abdallah Azzam
 
Abdallah Azzam 
 Dr. Abdallah Azzam was born in the West Bank in 1941 to a relatively anonymous family. 
Azzam was partially radicalized by his Palestinian upbringing. However, Azzam was also 
radicalized by his Islamic studies at Damascus University where he joined the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1954. Notably, Azzam would later become one of the only al-Qaeda leaders with 
significant academic credentials in religious studies. In this sense, Azzam would become the 
spiritual father for the jihadist movement. His life story gives us a better insight into the religio-
political debates that shaped the future of al-Qaeda for years to come.  
After joining the Brotherhood, Azzam became quite remarkable in da’wa (an Islamic form 
of proselytizing). He also became well connected to key Islamist mentors including Shafiq Abd 
al-Hadi, Shaikh Fayiz Jarrar, and Muhammad abd al-Rahman Khalifa. Finally, as part of the 
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Brotherhood, Azzam became enthralled by the work of Sayyid Qutb, a prominent radical thinker 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. Azzam was particularly drawn to Qutb’s writings that posited two key 
ideas: (1) that modern Muslim societies are in a state of jahiliyya (ungodly ignorance) and (2) that 
there is a divine right to establish an Islamic state (hakimiyya). 
When Qutb was executed in 1966, Azzam was devastated, even writing a telegram of 
protest to Qutb’s executioner, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser. A year later, in 1967, the 
Six-Day War began, even reaching Azzam’s home village of al-Sila. The combination of his 
Palestinian roots with his Muslim Brotherhood teachings enraged Azzam, causing him to leave his 
home for the Jordanian-Israeli border. In 1969, Azzam began fighting with a little-known, 
Brotherhood-affiliated organization called Fedayin, marking the official beginning of Azzam’s 
status as a mujahid (freedom fighter). 
Azzam quickly rose in the ranks of Fedayin and was a part of the organization until its very 
end. After the 1970 Jordanian Black September, a period when Jordanian forces assaulted and 
killed thousands of opposition figures, Fedayin was defeated. The rupture of Azzam’s organization 
left him ever more ready to confront the “corrupt” Arab regimes of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. 
However, Azzam did not continue with his combative streak for long; in 1971, Azzam 
began studying at al-Azhar University to receive his PHD in Islamic Law. In addition to producing 
a 600-page long dissertation, Azzam also became close with many members of the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood. While never meeting Sayyid Qutb, Azzam is recorded to have been close to 
his family. At such a point in the Brotherhood’s existence, there was significant debate between 
the more moderate “Bannanist” faction and the more extremist “Qutbist” faction, of which Azzam 
certainly supported the latter.56 During this time, Azzam declared takfir (a formal Islamic 
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disavowal of another’s faith) on secular Arab leaders and leftists. Upon graduating in 1973, Azzam 
returned to Jordan where he became a lecturer at the University of Jordan. Many of his students, 
particularly those of Palestinian origins, went on to join Hamas.57 
Azzam’s professorship opened many networking doors for him and significantly grew his 
prestige as a religious scholar. Azzam traveled extensively spreading da’wa. As described by 
Khaled al-Fawwaz, an associate of Azzam, “Azzam was a one-man ‘wire service’ for the jihad 
movement, traveling to Kuwait, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United States to gather 
and spread news, recruit men, and raise millions of dollars for the cause.”58 It was through these 
efforts that Azzam met a young Usama bin Laden in Indianapolis, Indiana in 1978. By the end of 
1970s, Azzam had made a name for himself as a prominent Jordanian Islamist. 
This notoriety often got Azzam into trouble with Jordanian authorities, whom he critiqued 
extensively. Azzam claimed that Jordanian politics were un-Islamic and that the Jordanian regime 
directly supported Israel. Azzam was also frustrated by Jordan’s support for the Iraqi government 
during the Iran-Iraq war. Due to his political activism, Azzam eventually got fired from the 
University of Jordan. Concurrently, it is widely believed that Azzam was simultaneously expelled 
from Jordan. 
In 1980, Azzam and his family left Jordan for Mecca, Saudi Arabia. It was during this time 
that Azzam became formally acquainted with the young bin Laden, though they were not close 
friends.59 At this point, though he had a stable teaching job in Mecca, Azzam was quite focused 
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on the foreign affairs of the umma (Islamic community). As Azzam’s biographer, Thomas 
Hegghammer, writes: 
[Azzam] himself later said he had wanted to get involved in a military struggle, but he was not sure which 
one. He eventually narrowed the choice down to two options: Yemen or Afghanistan: “I looked for a 
battlefield [saha], and there was a jihad in Yemen and a jihad in Afghanistan, and I said “let’s go to one of 
the two battlefronts and start practicing our vocation, which is jihad.”60 
 
Azzam was ready for a fight, growing anxious by his teaching career. Notably, however, it was 
not until a year later when his close friend and Egyptian Brotherhood member, Kamal al-Sananiri, 
encouraged him to join him in Afghanistan that Azzam truly chose Afghanistan over Yemen. In 
fact, it even took some persuasion.61 Such indecision reflects how the struggle in Afghanistan was 
not endemic to Azzam’s conception of jihad; rather, Azzam chose to leave for Afghanistan 
somewhat on a whim. Of course, Azzam felt sympathy for the Afghani cause. But it was not as 
though his path to Afghanistan was linear in any means. 
 Once in Afghanistan—or, really, in Peshawar, Pakistan—Azzam began to serve as an Arab 
negotiator between Afghani mujahidin. Azzam made key allies of Abd Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf and 
Abdallah Anas, figureheads for the Afghan Mujahidin. Azzam also built strong relations with 
members of the Saudi and Pakistani government. Such relations allowed Azzam to organize his 
own movement, the Services Bureau (Maktab al-Khidamat), “an organization devoted to hosting 
Arab volunteers and putting them to good use in the Afghan jihad.”62 
While, at first, Azzam struggled for funding, he found monetary support in the form of an 
old friend, Osama bin Laden. With Bin Laden’s funding, Azzam was able to grow the Services 
Bureau into an extensive apparatus. The Bureau: extensively recruited foreign volunteers to the 
Afghan cause, handled the reception of new recruits, built an apparatus of on-the-ground 
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intelligence, educated Afghani refugees on Islam, provided humanitarian aid to the Afghan 
Mujahidin and their dependents, assisted the Afghanistan mujahidin with military logistics, and 
published many materials including the popular, monthly Arabic language magazine, al-Jihad. In 
all of these simultaneous efforts, Azzam’s Services Bureau extensively raised awareness about the 
plight of the Afghanis to the rest of the Muslim umma. 
By 1986, bin Laden set up a training camp for Afghan Arabs in southwest Peshawar, 
nominalizing it as Sada (“Echo”). 63 The Sada camp became a part of the Services Bureau and 
ultimately, its main training facility.64 However, the Sada camp was also a point of contention 
between Azzam and bin Laden—bin Laden saw the training at the camp as insufficient and 
“basic.”65 
Bin Laden ultimately launched his own project in al-Ma’sada. Azzam reportedly knew of 
the project’s existence, even visiting the site in 1987. Though Azzam did not fully approve of al-
Ma’sada, there was not much that he could do, and he resigned to let al-Ma’sada be incorporated 
into the Services Bureau. Al-Ma’sada is the force that would later become incorporated into al-
Qaeda. However, importantly, Azzam was a periphery figure in al-Ma’sada’s formation. Some 
scholars attribute Azzam as the “co-founder of al-Qaeda,” but this is clearly untrue; Azzam’s 
organization was an affiliate of al-Ma’sada but Azzam himself did not explicitly condone the 
group’s formation.66  
On November 24, 1989, just two years after the formation of al-Ma’sada, Azzam was 
assassinated. The event was described by Hegghammer as “the biggest murder mystery in the 
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history of jihadism.”67 There are competing claims for who ordered the assassination, with 
potential suspects being Saudi, Jordanian, Israeli, Afghan, Pakistani, or U.S. intelligence forces. 
Others claim individuals such as Osama bin Laden, leader of the Afghan Mujahidin party Hezb-e 
Islami, or Ayman al-Zawahiri, were to blame for Azzam’s death. 
Despite who may have assassinated him, Azzam will be remembered as one of the fathers 
of modern jihad. Scholar of global jihad, Dr. Paul Kamolnick, attributes four essential components 
of al-Qaeda to Azzam. First, he writes that Azzam was influential in characterizing Muslim 
opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as defensive jihad (jihad al-daf) via a highly 
revered legal opinion (fatwa).68 This was a fatwa Azzam declared in 1985, which centralized the 
role of jihad al-daf  in the Afghani struggle.69 In Azzam’s 1984 book Defense of Muslim Lands, 
Azzam described jihad al-daf as a “compulsory duty” that arises “if the Kuffar [unbelievers] enter 
a land of the Muslims.”70 In fact, “Azzam was probably the first trained ‘alim to articulate an 
elaborate legal argument for [defensive] jihad as an individual obligation for all in the modern 
era.”7172 
Secondly, Azzam was influential in using jihad al-daf to justify military struggles against 
non-Muslim governments. Azzam centralized territorial conquest as the means to Muslim 
reassertion of control over the Middle East. However, Azzam does crucially differ from his 
successors, bin Laden and Zawahiri in particular, as Azzam does not call for an Islamic state.  
Thirdly, Azzam was passionate about the armies that would re-conquer former Muslim 
lands to be Muslim armies; thus, he was a staunch advocate of supporting the Afghan mujahidin. 
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Azzam’s organization, the Services Bureau, solely focused on enticing Arab and foreign recruits 
to the cause of the Afghani jihad. Yet, Azzam hoped that these recruits, today called Arab-Afghans, 
would serve as a support to the mujahidin cause.73 As described by John A. Turner, “Azzam 
transformed a mixed group of jihadists, working with national movements into a unified 
international force during the Soviet Afghan War.”74 
Although bin Laden and Azzam were friends and agreed on most issues, the status of 
Afghan Arabs in the mujahidin was one they would disagree on.  
[Azzam] thought that Arabs, like all foreign fighters, were there to assist the Afghans and should be 
integrated into their structures and under the control of the Afghan commanders. Bin Laden, by 
contrast, wanted some or all Arabs kept apart, thus creating his own apparati.75 
 
Finally, Azzam was committed to martyrdom, the conception that dying while killing was 
a noble Islamic cause.76 
Azzam’s conceptions were not novel; many of his ideas, particularly about jihad al-daf, 
are rooted in ideas popularized by the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism. In fact, Azzam 
represents a significant link between Salafism and Ikhwanism (the ideology of the Muslim 
Brotherhood), even though both ideologies have a history of competition.77 As described by 
Hegghammer: 
On the one hand, he self-described as a Muslim Brother, venerated Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid 
Qutb, and used Qutbist terminology such as hakimiyya (sovereignty) and jahiliyya (age of 
ignorance). On the other, he also self-described as a Salafi, quoted Ibn Taymiyya, and expanded on 
terms associated with Salafism such as tawhid (oneness of God) and al-wala’ a’l-bara (loyalty and 
disavowal).78 
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In joining Salafi and Brotherhood ideologies, Azzam, either consciously or unknowingly, averted 
factionalism within the umma. Azzam is regarded by many jihadists today as one of the most 
significant martyrs and ideologues of the twentieth century. Certainly, while not the founder of al-
Qaeda, Azzam was crucial in ideological support for the organization. 
Osama Bin Laden 
 Perhaps the most well-known figure of modern jihadism is Osama bin Laden, the chief 
financier and founder of al-Qaeda. Born in 1957 into a wealthy family in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden 
was surrounded by conservative Islam in the form of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is named after the 
prominent thinker, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who believed in a “moral renewal of Islam 
by cleansing the umma of unbelief (kufr), any perceived violations of tawhid (belief in the unity 
of God, monotheism, and all practices thought to corrupt the principles of the pure faith as 
adumbrated in the scriptures and the example of the salaf, the first generations of Muslims.”79  
Though Wahhabi doctrine was key in bin Laden’s theological upbringing, it is also notable 
that Ikhwanism was not absent from bin Laden’s life. Bin Laden encountered many former 
Brotherhood members fleeing Syria, Jordan, and Egypt during his childhood, including 
Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid Qutb.80 As earlier noted, bin Laden also became well 
acquainted with Abdallah Azzam who was a professor at King Abdul Aziz University when bin 
Laden was a student there. Thus, like Azzam, bin Laden straddled the line between Wahhabism 
and Ikhwanism.  
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 When bin Laden was twenty-three, he was recruited by the then head of Saudi intelligence, 
Prince Turki al-Faisal “to help organize the flow of Saudi funds and equipment to the mujahidin 
who had taken up arms against the Russian-backed regime in Afghanistan.”81 Bin Laden first 
traveled to Peshawar in 1980 and moved there permanently in 1982.82 It was in Peshawar that bin 
Laden reconnected with Azzam. With Azzam, bin Laden helped to recruit Arabs to the Afghan 
cause and also funded the Services Bureau. Bin Laden offered to pay the expenses (roughly $300 
per month) of any Arab who would fight in Afghanistan.83 Bin Laden also set up a guest house, 
Beit al-Ansar, in Peshawar (House of the Supporters) to help house these new recruits.84 Finally, 
bin Laden directed funding at his own organization Sijiill al-Qaeda (Register of the Base), which 
would later become the foundation of al-Qaeda.85 Bin Laden and Azzam’s efforts paid off; by 
1989, it was estimated that there were around four thousand Arab volunteers in Afghanistan.86  
Bin Laden and Azzam were such great recruiters of Afghan Arabs that it caught the CIA’s 
attention. However, contrary to popular belief, for the time being, attention from the CIA is all bin 
Laden caught; bin Laden was nothing more than a small file among many other intelligence 
reports. Proposals to expand funding for bin Laden and Azzam’s organizations “never moved 
beyond the talking stage.”87 Despite the speculation that bin Laden and the CIA collaborated, there 
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is no proof that there have ever been any monetary contributions from the CIA to the Afghan Arab 
cause.88 
In 1986, bin Laden began collaborating with the Pakistani secret service (ISI) and the CIA 
to build a tunnel complex on the border close to the Pakistani Border, the Khost tunnel complex, 
and a mountain base, Tora Bora.89 Notably, though the projects were funded by the CIA, the 
projects were focused on construction; not on the creation of a robust Afghan Arab fighting 
brigade. According to some reports, the construction projects were a sense of tension between 
Azzam and Bin Laden.90 Azzam considered the projects to be a waste of money and that the 
projects diverted from the Afghan Arab’s main purpose in Afghanistan; however, bin Laden had 
his sights set on having his own training camp. 
Later in 1986, bin Laden opened his first training facility in Jaji. It was called by some as 
al- Masada (the Lion’s Den) and by others as al Ansar (the Partisans).91 In 1987, the site was 
bombed by Soviets, killing dozens of bin Laden’s men.92 The battle ended with bin Laden and his 
men retreating. Nonetheless, the battle at Jaji “marked the birth of Osama bin Laden’s public 
reputation as a warrior among Arab jihadists.”93 Bin Laden was able to use the battle as proof of 
his fighting prowess.94 The Service Bureau’s magazine, Jihad, printed many stories of bin Laden’s 
battle, popularizing his name as a fighting hero and helping spread recruitment efforts to Muslims 
globally. 
The media campaign that bin Laden waged after the 1987 battle of Jaji led bin Laden to 
become close with Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian doctor who would become bin Laden’s closest 
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advisor.95  Zawahiri was radicalized in Egyptian prison after being imprisoned and extensively 
tortured by Sadat’s orders.96 The experience shaped Zawahiri’s religio-political views, making 
him extremely keen on bringing the mujahidin’s fight to the rest of the Arab world. In fact, though 
Zawahiri was in Peshawar with the other Afghan Arab fighters, Zawahiri was uninterested in the 
Afghani struggle against the Soviets. According to a confidant of Azzam, “In Peshawar, we didn’t 
count Zawahiri as a mujahid. He was just sitting in Peshawar trying to recruit people to fight 
against Egypt. Osama became a part of this Egyptian group…”97 Thus, by 1988, al-Zawahiri had 
already become such an intimate confidant of bin Laden that he was defining both the social circles 
of bin Laden and bin Laden’s ideological agenda. 
Even before Azzam’s death in 1989, the split between bin Laden and Azzam’s goals 
manifested itself. On one hand, this was due to a strategic divergence between the two men; as 
earlier suggested, bin Laden was beginning to focus more on developing a Islamist fighting 
apparatus than on supporting the Afghani cause. According to the Palestinian journalist, Jamal 
Ismail, this manifested by 1988, Osama bin Laden no longer financially contributed to the Services 
Bureau.98  
However, there was another reason for Azzam and bin Laden’s split. The novel relationship 
between bin Laden and al-Zawahiri threatened bin Laden’s relationship with Azzam. Zawahiri 
was an intriguing, politically seasoned figure who “turned bin laden against Abdullah Azzam” and 
introduced bin Laden to more hardline Islamist leadership.99 Zawahiri even allegedly instructed 
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his followers not to pray with Azzam, a serious repudiation in Islam.100 To any degree, the tension 
between Azzam and bin Laden never manifested itself further, because Azzam was assassinated 
in 1989. 
There is some disagreement between scholars about the formal beginning of al-Qaeda. 
Some scholars go as far to argue that al-Qaeda never existed until the 1998 trial of four men 
charged with the 1998 U.S. embassy bombing in East Africa.101 Such claims stem from a 
conception of al-Qaeda solely as an ideology and claim that bin Laden was nearly an insignificant 
member of the group.102 However, these arguments have since been dismissed as “utter nonsense” 
given that there is significant evidence that al Qaeda had a formal funding apparatus and leadership 
structure that traces back to at least 1988.103 
On the other end of the spectrum, some scholars confuse an article written by Azzam, al-
qaeda al-sulbah (The Solid Base), as the founding document for al-Qaeda.104 However, as pointed 
out by Thomas Hegghammer, “The article merely says Afghanistan is the territorial base on which 
the Islamist movement must establish itself before it can make further conquests.”105 The article 
does not indicate that a formal group had formed. Moreover, given Azzam’s reluctance to bring 
the fight of Afghanistan to the entire Arab world, it is extremely unlikely that Azzam would be the 
founding member of al-Qaeda, an organization whose modus operandi was the targeting of corrupt 
Arab governments. 
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 There are two likely theories for the formal creation of al-Qaeda. The first was proposed 
by historian Mahmood Mamdani. He writes that, following the death of Azzam in 1979, an 
infamous meeting was held in Khost that determined the path of al-Qaeda. During that meeting, 
the ten men in the room, including bin Laden, decided “to wage jihad beyond the borders of 
Afghanistan.”106 In order to do so, the organizers created a new organization, al-Qaeda, and 
decided that bin Laden would be the leader. 
 However, another likely theory is proposed by terrorism journalist Peter L. Bergen, 
suggesting that al-Qaeda may have even existed prior to the death of Azzam. Bergen cites 
handwritten correspondences between bin Laden and his associates directing them to pay Islamist 
salaries on a monthly basis. Some documents uncovered by Bergen even give the minutes of 
meetings in which new recruits are to be inducted into a “new military group” which would include 
“al Qaeda.”107 The meeting is thought to have started on August 18, 1988, and included Abu 
Ubaidah, al-Qaeda’s military commander and Abu Hajir, al-Qaeda’s religious advisor.108 Bergen 
uses the date September 10, 1988, the date of the first letter, as the official starting date for al-
Qaeda. 
In any regard, al-Qaeda was likely formed through a series of meetings between the end of 
1988 and 1989. At the time, intelligence forces were unaware of the implications of this new Jihadi 
group. 
Nonetheless, bin Laden’s relationship with intelligence forces grew strained. During the 
First Gulf War of 1990, bin Laden offered the Afghan Arab’s services in support of Kuwait to the 
Saudi royal family. According to a study by Euben and Zamman: 
The royal family rejected the offer, opting instead to permit thousands of U.S. troops into the 
Kingdom to launch Operation Desert Storm and pressured several Saudi ‘ulama to endorse the 
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decision. Bin Laden, in turn, accused the Saudi regime of relinquishing to infidels the duty of 
defending the land of Muhammad and of violating Islamic law by entering in a pact with non-
Muslims to fight other Muslims (i.e. Iraqis).109 
 
Of course, such threats were not taken lightly by the repressive Saudi regime which derived its 
authority from religious legitimacy. When bin Laden began speaking out in Jedda about his desires 
to fight the Hussein regime, the Saudis grew angry. Bin Laden even published a letter to King Fahd, 
“The Letter of Demands,” calling for reforms within the Kingdom.110 After this letter, the Saudi 
Royal family restricted bin Laden’s travel within the Kingdom. Bin Laden, in turn, sought refuge 
in Sudan. In 1994, the Saudi royal family revoked bin Laden’s citizenship permanently and, in 
1996, bin Laden was expelled from Sudan. 
Part of the reason for bin Laden’s expulsion from Sudan was his anti-American activities. 
Oddly, although it is thought that bin Laden had businesses during his time in Sudan, he was still 
trying to build his fighting brigade.111 During his early years in Sudan, bin Laden facilitated the 
travel of Arab Afghan veterans to Somalia to assist in anti-US demonstrations. In 1993, it was these 
Somalis with the assistance of the Afghan Arabs that caused the events of Black Hawk Down, the 
death of seventeen Americans. And, according to scholar Bruce Lawrence, “It is virtually certain 
that bin Laden was also attempting to organize underground opposition to the regime in Riyadh.”112 
Certainly, al-Qaeda was still active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bin Laden’s group operated 
several training camps: Khalid ibn Walid, al-Farough, Sadeek, Khaldan, Jihad Wal, and Darunta.113 
The noise created from the continuation of al-Qaeda caused Egypt, the United States, and Saudi 
Arabia to put increasing pressure on Sudan to expel bin Laden. The U.S. even imposed economic 
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sanctions, which Sudanese government felt could strongly curtail future investment.114 Thus, after 
only five years, bin Laden was expelled from Sudan. 
After being kicked out of Sudan, bin Laden sought refuge in a familiar location, Tora Bora, 
Afghanistan, where he was warmly welcomed by the Taliban.115 As will be further discussed in the 
next chapter, bin Laden now used al-Qaeda as a base for a series of attacks against the US. Some 
of these were rhetorical, such as his infamous 1996 speech in which bin Laden declared war on the 
United States or bin Laden’s “the Crusaders and the Jews” 1998 speech.116 Bin Laden also increased 
his rhetoric against the U.S. in many interviews on CNN, ABC News, and al Jazeera.117 Most 
significantly, though, during this time, bin Laden was also responsible for directing the U.S. 
embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.118 Then, in 2000, al-Qaeda suicide attackers nearly 
sank a U.S. destroyer, the U.S.S. Cole attack in Yemen. These attacks significantly raised the profile 
of al-Qaeda and, subsequently, the profile of bin Laden.  
In 1998, bin Laden was able to create a new organization, the World Islamic Front, with the 
help of al-Zawahiri and other Pakistani Islamists.119 Bin Laden also created one of the most 
prominent paramilitary Islamist organizations, Harkat ul-Ansar, which was once funded by the 
United States. In creating such organizations, bin Laden represented the new phase he had entered 
in the late 1990s: all-out holy war against the United States. 
All of bin Laden’s increased activity was not without serious push-back from the United 
States and its allies. In August 1998, the U.S. Navy sent cruise missiles to al-Qaeda’s training camps 
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in Khost, Afghanistan.120 The attacks nearly killed bin Laden.121 Yet, instead of decimating bin 
Laden’s camp and killing bin Laden himself, the attacks only raised the profile of al-Qaeda’s 
mission. The U.S. also attempted to pressure the Taliban to expel bin Laden, though they were met 
with refusal by bin Laden’s main ally, Taliban leader Mullah Omar.122 Saudi intelligence officers 
also sent assassins to Afghanistan to kill bin Laden.123 Such attacks were, obviously, unsuccessful. 
 Also unsuccessful was the U.S. intelligence community’s ability to predict the events that 
would eventually unfold on September 11, 2001. Despite their increased focus on bin Laden, the 
intelligence community clearly missed what bin Laden had been planning all along—a massive 
attack on U.S. soil. Notably, “While bin Laden did not involve himself in the details of the 9/11 
operation, he was its ultimate commander,” as journalist Peter Bergen described.124 Bin Laden was 
not only the founder of the al-Qaeda apparatus, but also an overseer to its key operations. 
 After the 9/11 attacks, the United States began a massive air campaign against al-Qaeda’s 
central forces in Afghanistan. Apparently, this was a surprise to bin Laden. As described by Bergen: 
Bin Laden disastrously misjudged the American response to the 9/11 attacks, which he believed 
would be one of two strategies: an eventual retreat from the Middle East along the lines of the U.S. 
pullout from Somalia in 1993, or a full-scale American ground invasion of Afghanistan similar to 
the Soviet invasion of 1979, which would then allow the Taliban and al Qaeda to fight a classic 
guerrilla war. Neither of these two scenarios happened. The U.S. campaign against the Taliban was 
conducted with massive U.S. airpower, tens of thousands of Northern Alliance forces, and no more 
than three hundred U.S. Special Forces soldiers on the ground. And al Qaeda, which means “the 
base” in Arabic, subsequently lost the best base it ever had. 9/11 may have been a tactical victory 
for al Qaeda, but it was a strategic disaster for the organization.125 
 
Bergen makes clear that bin Laden misjudged the response of the Americans, expecting the U.S. 
military to wage a ground war in which al-Qaeda would be able to extract casualties from the U.S. 
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ground troops. On the contrary, al-Qaeda was forced to retreat to the mountains of Tora Bora, 
Afghanistan, where it was more difficult for the Americans to attack.126 
Moreover, al-Qaeda’s Tora Bora site allowed a way for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to escape 
into Pakistan, which both groups took advantage of that December.127 From that point on, bin 
Laden flew entirely under the radar of U.S. intelligence. For many years, it was thought that bin 
Laden was on the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan—a 1,500-mile-long terrain.128 
Eventually, bin Laden was found in the town of Abbottabad, Pakistan. Bin Laden was killed 
through a SEAL team raid on May 2nd, 2011.129  
Despite his death, bin Laden’s legacy looms larger than the man himself. In terms of his 
ideological legacy, bin Laden largely impacted al-Qaeda in three key ways. First, as earlier 
recorded in arguments between bin Laden and Azzam, bin Laden was keen to target Western 
governments. Unlike the jihadists before him, bin Laden described targeting Arab regimes as 
“cutting a tentacle of the octopus” and “as long as the number of [mujahid] youth is few and our 
capabilities are limited, we should condense the matters by striking the head.”130 The struggle 
against corruption in the Arab world would have to wait; bin Laden was focused on the “far 
enemy.” Although such a perspective was “never embraced by the vast majority of existing Sunni 
Islamist insurgents,131 bin Laden forged a legacy of attacking the enemy on its own soil that lasts 
until today. 
 
126 Ibid, 328. 
127 Ibid, 330. 
128 Ibid, 380. 
129 For a complete description of bin Laden’s assassination, see: Nicholas Schmidle, “Getting Bin Laden,” (The New 
Yorker: August 8, 2011), https://www.thomasweibel.ch/artikel/110808_new_yorker_getting_bin_laden.pdf. 
130 Bin Laden’s Bushriyaat (Glad Tidings) speech quoted in Kamolnick, The Al-Qaeda Organization and the Islamic 
State Organization, 48. 
131 Ibid, xvii. 
41 
 
Secondly, as will be further discussed in the next chapter, bin Laden was brilliant in 
creating a robust media strategy for his new organization. Unlike Azzam, whose da’wa 
(proselytizing) only made it as far as cassette tapes, bin Laden’s da’wa reached NBC, al-Jazeera, 
and BBC. Bin Laden had even began to post content to the web, as bin Laden’s biographer put it, 
after bin Laden’s created jihadi internet culture, “Signing up for the jihad [was] a mouse click 
away.”132 
Finally, bin Laden was an ardent supporter of tawhid (the Islamic conception of unity). 
While al-Qaeda views Shi’a Muslims as a devious sect, bin Laden himself refused to explicitly 
denounce Shi’a as kufr (infidels). The kufar (multiple kufr) bin Laden focused on were agents of 
the Western world.133 Indeed, some reports suggest that when bin Laden was in Sudan, he met 
with Hezbollah leader, Imad Mugniyeh, and that Hezbollah even provided explosives training and 
weaponry for al-Qaeda.134 Moreover, since 9/11, many al-Qaeda leaders have been found hiding 
in Iran, suggesting a pseudo-alliance between al-Qaeda and the Shia, Iranian leadership.135 This is 
not to suggest that bin Laden approved of Shiism; but rather, that bin Laden outweighed unity over 
confrontation with the Shi’a. As will come to be seen when discussing al-Qaeda’s successor, ISIS, 
a tolerance towards Shi’i will certainly not be the case. 
 
132 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 390. 
133 There is significant speculation as to why bin Laden would not explicitly denounce Shiism. For one, Kamolnick 
describes how bin Laden’s own mother was Syrian with an Alawite (a Shia sect) background, suggesting that his 
“filial tenderness” accounts for his lack of condemnation. [Kamolnick, The Al-Qaeda Organization and the Islamic 
State Organization, 22]. 
134 Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know, 143. 
135 Kamolnick, The Al-Qaeda Organization and the Islamic State Organization, 22; For more on the topic, see: Cole 
Bunzel, “Why are al Qaeda Leaders in Iran? What a Prisoner Exchange Reveals About an Unlikely Relationship,” 




  Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi 
 Before discussing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, it is important for readers to differentiate al-
Zarqawi from his predecessors. While Abdallah Azzam and Osama bin Laden were close friends, 
the interpersonal relationship between Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi looked quite 
different. For one, Osama bin Laden was a university-educated Saudi from a well-respected 
family. Al-Zawahiri was even better educated, with a PHD from al-Azhar. Compared to the two 
men, al-Zarqawi was relatively unknown—al-Zarqawi (who was then known by the name of 
Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah) was from an anonymous family and was a high school drop-
out.136 He was a man who “was fired from a job as a video-store clerk and whose background 
included street gangs and, according to Jordanian intelligence officials, prison for sexual 
assault.”137 While al-Zarqawi would become a prominent figure in the jihadi movement, he was 
certainly on the periphery of the bin Laden’s inner circle. This lack of strong relationship would 
shape al-Zarqawi’s lack of robust connection to al-Qaeda; and, ultimately, partially explain why 
ISIS and al-Qaeda diverged. 
 Al-Zarqawi’s roots somewhat explain his divergence from bin Laden. However, al-
Zarqawi’s upbringing does not explain why al-Zarqawi was radicalized; unlike bin Laden and 
Azzam, al-Zarqawi did not show up to Afghanistan ready to wage jihad. In fact, in sharp contrast 
to bin Laden and Azzam, al-Zarqawi had little religious background. He was a heavy drinker with 
many tattoos.138 It was not until al-Zarqawi’s mother enrolled him in religious instruction at the 
al-Husayn Ben Ali Mosque, a mosque inspired by Salafist traditions, that al-Zarqawi began to 
straighten out. Nonetheless, “al-Zarqawi was not yet a convert to extremism,” as al-Zarqawi’s 
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biographer, Jean-Charles Brisard argues; al-Zarqawi was simply going through the motions139 
According to an imam at the mosque, it was the adventure of Afghanistan that seemed to enthrall 
a young al-Zarqawi, rather than the Islamist underpinnings of the conflict.140 
 Unfortunately for al-Zarqawi, he arrived in Khost, Afghanistan, by the time the Soviets 
were already withdrawing. Nonetheless, al-Zarqawi decided to stay in Afghanistan. It was there 
he met Mohammed Taher al-Barqawi, alias: Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, an influential spiritual 
leader with ties to the World Islamic League, a prominent jihadist organization in Afghanistan. 
Given his many ties to the jihadist movement, al-Maqdisi was “at the heart of al-Qaeda,” and was 
thought to be a significant part of its foundation. Al-Maqdisi’s hardlined Salafist thinking would 
leave a substantial spiritual impression on the young al-Zarqawi, and their relationship likely 
accounts for a turn of al-Zarqawi to a more conservative, Islamist ideology.141 
 Professionally speaking, al-Zarqawi was shaped by another key jihadi figure, Saleh al-
Hami. Al-Hami was a Jordanian-Palestinian who worked for Azzam’s magazine, al-Jihad.142 
According to al-Hami, al-Hami supported al-Zarqawi when he wanted to begin a career in 
journalism.143 Al-Zarqawi, at least for a short while, worked for a small jihadist magazine, al-
Bonian al-Marsous (The Impenetrable Edifice).144 Al-Bonian al-Marsous would later become “the 
ideological spearhead of al-Qaeda.”145 Al-Zarqawi’s career in journalism would not last long, but 
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these early years clearly shaped al-Zarqawi’s perspective on jihad; to al-Zarqawi, media was 
always central to the jihadist struggle.  
 In 1993, al-Zarqawi returned to Jordan.  Even though al-Zarqawi had only been gone for 
four years, Jordan looked far different than it had when he, and his fellow Afghan Arabs, had 
left.146 The same year al-Zarqawi returned, Iraq had lost the Gulf War to secular, American forces, 
the Palestinains had signed the Oslo Accords, and the Jordanians and the Israelis were working 
towards a peace deal.147 For the Afghan Arabs, these political events were enraging.  
The police were increasingly alarmed by the rise of religious extremism and were constantly 
cracking down on terrorist gangs. The jihadists returned as hardened men who were struggling to 
give up their fighting spirit.148 Zarqawi quickly found al-Maqdisi and their jihad ensued. 
 With an influx of Jordanian Afghan War veterans, al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi had many 
recruits to their cause. They named their new organization Bayit al-Imam (Allegiance to the 
Imams). Its key aim was to overthrow corrupt Arab governments, particularly the Jordanian 
regime.149  Apparently, Bayit al-Imam became so popular that it received funding from Osama bin 
Laden, though the record is convoluted.150 In any case, the group only lasted formally for a single 
year. Zarqawi and Maqdisi would both be arrested in March, 1994.151 The formation of the group 
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would come to represent the growing frustration of jihadis from Afghanistan with their own 
governments. Unlike bin Laden’s movement that stayed in Afghanistan, many of those who soon 
returned home now had grievances directed at their relatively secular governments. 
 Zarqawi did not waste time in prison. The time “made him more focused, brutal, and 
decisive.”152 In 1998, after the embassy bombings, Zarqawi reportedly told his cellmates that he 
intended to “join the attack on American targets.”153 Yet, that was not all that Zarqawi intended. 
During prison, Zarqawi began to espouse targets at any “unbeliever.” As described by his 
biographer: 
For Zarqawi, the term “unbeliever” covers a rather heterogeneous set of people, including not only 
Christians and Jews but also Shiites, Hindus, and more generally, all those who do not strictly adhere 
to the tenets of Salafism. By the end of his incarceration in Jordanian prisons he had been won over 
by the Manichean idea that there are two worlds: the world of Sunni Muslim believers of the Salafist 
persuasion and the world of the others, the kafirs or unbelievers, among whom he counts Muslism 
themselves when they collaborate with the “implacable” enemies: Israel and the United States. No 
individual belonging to the second category deserves to live.154 
 
Clearly, al-Zarqawi’s time in prison was hardening him. He was becoming both a leader and an 
ideological zealot, all in one.  
 In 1999, al-Zarqawi got a rare break. In an effort to appease the Jordanian Muslim 
Brotherhood, a new Jordanian administration released about 3,000 prisoners.155 Al-Zarqawi was 
among them. Maqdisi was also released, though three years later, he would be sent back.156  
 About a month after his release, al-Zarqawi, acknowledging that it was too dangerous for 
him to stay in Jordan, moved to Hayatabad, Pakistan. As his biographer writes, “It was not by 
chance that Zarqawi had come there. He knew that if he wanted to plan large-scale operations, he 
had to get closer to Al-Qaeda’s decision center and especially Osama bin Laden himself.”157 
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By the Summer of 1999, al-Zarqawi had nearly succeeded in his goals. By leveraging his 
relationships with key Jordanians such as Abu Zubaydah, al-Qaeda’s head of operations, al-
Zarqawi became one of bin Laden’s lieutenants.158 Al-Zarqawi also received a letter of 
endorsement from Abu Kutaiba al-Urdani, a Jordanian who worked in Azzam’s Service’s 
Bureau.159 The letter helped al-Zarqawi to curry favor with bin Laden, at least initially. 
 However, things went awry for Zarqawi when, in December 1999, he finally got the chance 
to meet bin Laden. As a former Israeli intelligence official reported, “it was loathing at first site.”160 
As earlier suggested, the class differences between bin Laden and al-Zarqawi would become 
visceral. There were also other sources of tension. Bin Laden was suspicious of the Jordanian, 
believing that he may have been infiltrated by Jordanian intelligence.161 He also felt that al-
Zarqawi’s hatred towards the Shi’a was divisive. By all accounts, bin Laden was a unifier, 
concerned with tawhid (unity) of the umma (Muslim community). Al-Zarqawi and bin Laden’s 
conceptions of takfir and the most pressing goals of jihad were simply incompatible.  
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 In 2000, al-Zarqawi moved from Kandahar to Herat, an Afghan city on the Iranian 
border.163 Although bin Laden gave al-Zarqawi seed money to set up a training camp, the 
geographic distance between the two men made bin Laden suspicious.164 Already concerned that 
al-Zarqawi was a Jordanian intelligence services’ “plant,” bin Laden’s suspicions only grew 
further.165 Not to mention, in a 2000 meeting between bin Laden and Zarqawi, bin Laden asked 
Zarqawi to pledge baya (a religious oath of allegiance) to him.166 Zarqawi refused. 
 During the following year, despite bin Laden’s suspicions, the Herat training camp would 
multiply from dozens to hundreds.167 Zarqawi would eventually call his camp Jamaat Tawhid wal 
Jihad (JTWJ, School of Unity and Jihad).168 While based in Herat, JTWJ began to extend its 
operations to Jordan, Iraq and Israel.169 Al-Zarqawi’s associates, Abu Abdel Rahman al-Shami 
(Ra’id Khuraysat), Mahmoud Muhammad al-Nusur, and Mutasim Musa Abdallah Muhammad al-
Darikah, were sent to “reorganize the Islamist resistance” in Iraqi Kurdistan. The mission would 
later become the foundation of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al-Zarqawi “set up an immigration pipeline 
to bring in Jordanian recruits [via] a channel passing through Iraq and Iran.”170  As will be 
discussed in more depth in two chapters, al-Zarqawi utilized both his Herat and Kurdistan bases 
to launch, or at least attempt to launch, several attacks against the “near enemy.”  
 After 9/11, everything changed for al-Qaeda. For one, al-Zarqawi’s Herat camp was 
bombed by the US. Al-Zarqawi and his associates then fled back to Kandahar where al-Qaeda 
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leadership was coalescing.171 In December 2001, al-Zarqawi reportedly even participated in the 
Battle of Tora Bora, the battle in which the U.S. first launched post-9/11 attacks aimed at capturing 
or killing Osama bin Laden. 
Then, Zarqawi fled to Iran. Admittedly, not much is known about Zarqawi’s time in Iran, 
though some records suggest he was reportedly arrested in Tehran in March 2002 alongside 150 
other members of al-Qaeda.172 Yet only a few weeks after his arrest, al-Zarqawi was released from 
prison and left Iran for a Baghdad hospital where he received medical treatment.173 Why he was 
released so quickly by Iranian authorities is unclear. Though the Iranians made a show of arrests 
to prove compliance with American directives, they seem to not have sentenced al-Zarqawi and 
his fellow al-Qaeda members to any meaningful sentences. It is also equally possible that al-
Zarqawi was never arrested. According to another biographer of al-Zarqawi, Fu’ad Hussein, al-
Zarqawi only spent a week in Iran.174 Nonetheless, both biographical accounts suggest that many 
al-Qaeda operatives were, indeed, arrested by Iranian authorities. The arrests likely had a 
significant impact in decreasing the size of al-Zarqawi’s group. 
At this point, al-Zarqawi had become a legend within the jihad movement. He had even 
attracted the attention of the Americans. He was even mentioned twenty-one times in a 2002 U.N. 
speech by Colin Powell.175 Powell claimed, incorrectly, that because al-Zarqawi spent time in a 
Baghdad hospital, this proved al-Zarqawi was a link between al-Qaeda and the Sadam Hussein 
regime. In fact, al-Zarqawi was not just unconnected to Hussein—al-Zarqawi was not even in Iraq 
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at the time. He was in Syria. While Powell’s claims were incorrect, they further helped to elevate 
the status of al-Zarqawi. 176 
Zarqawi’s status helped him to unify the increasing number of jihadist groups that were 
operating in Iraq. By the end of 2001, Mullah Krekar, the leader of a group called Ansar al-Islam, 
began working with al-Zarqawi. Though, in 2002, Mullah Krekar declared that allegations of his 
links with al-Qaeda were “totally unfounded,” records indicate that al-Zarqawi had defacto control 
of the group since December 2001.177 This added six hundred Arab Afghans to al-Zarqawi’s 
movement, Tawhid wal Jihad. In June 2003, a new group formed that opposed Ansar al-Islam, 
Ansar al-Sunna.178 Yet, by November, the group “carried out several joint operations with 
Zarqawi’s group.”179 Other groups that folded into Tawhid wal Jihad include Jaysh Mohammed, 
al-Jamaa Salafiya, Takfir wal Hijra, and Jund al-Sham. By 2004, Tawhid wal Jihad is estimated 
to have between 1,000 and 1,500 fighters, between 8,000 and 12,000 Islamist “resisters,” and 
around 20,000 sympathizers.180 Al-Zarqawi was creating an army. 
Not all of the new men recruited were Iraqi. In fact, many were from Jordan, Palestine, 
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and North Africa.181 Al-Zarqawi apparently began to focus more 
extensively on recruiting from Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria) and “as the recruitment process 
veered in the direction of Syria, so did Zarqawi’s reliance on Syrian jihadists.”182 One of Zarqawi’s 
Syrian financiers, Sulayman Khalid Darwish (aka Abu al-Ghadiya), specifically helped shuttle 
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fighters from Syria to Iraq.183 In short, al-Zarqawi significantly increased the infrastructure of al-
Qaeda in Iraq. 
However, al-Zarqawi had a specific strategy that importantly differed from bin Laden and 
al-Zawahiri’s in two different ways. First, al-Zarqawi knew how to utilize takfirism as a weapon. 
To recruit more fighters to his cause, al-Zarqawi took advantage of the heightening tensions 
between Shi’a and Sunni Iraqis.184 Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, in sharp contrast, were extremely 
cautious to upset the Shi’a. For one reason, al-Qaeda leaders were still in hiding, protected in Iran. 
Labeling the Shi’a as murtad (infidels), could lead to the imprisonment and/or deaths of al-Qaeda 
leaders. Moreover, both bin Laden and al-Zawahiri were worried about alienating Sunnis 
sympathetic to the Shi’a. Al-Zarqawi was ruining al-Qaeda Central (AQC’s) reputation. 
There is one important caveat in the development of this takfiri strategy. It is likely that, 
while al-Zarqawi was a figurehead for AQI’s growing divisiveness, the ideological roots for al-
Zarqawi’s takfirism lead back to Zarqawi’s deputy, Abu Ali al-Anbari (aka Abdulrahman al-
Qaduli). In a 2018 Atlantic piece, journalist Hassan Hassan describes how “it was Anbari, 
Zarqawi’s No.2 in his al-Qaeda years, who defined the Islamic State’s radical approach more than 
any other person; his influence was more systematic, longer lasting, and deeper than that of 
Zarqawi.”185 Hassan continues to argue that, in 2003, Anbari’s jihadist group, Tal Afar, was known 
to target anyone it considered heretical, including Shiites, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and local informants.186 Yet, prior to 2004, Zarqawi was largely fixated on secular Arab regimes, 
such as his home country of Jordan. In 2006, Anbari would ultimately be arrested by U.S. troops 
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in Baghdad. Nonetheless, Hassan’s case that Anbari significantly influenced Zarqawi, and, 
ultimately, the trajectory of al-Qaeda in Iraq, appears solid. 
Yet, in addition to infamy for the weaponization of takfirism, al-Zarqawi was becoming 
well known for his tactic of beheadings. Al-Zarqawi was even anointed as “the sheikh of the 
slaughterers,” given his reputation for brutal tactics. The imagery of slaughtering was perceived 
by many as simply grotesque, and certainly un-Islamic.187 Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri became 
concerned, yet again, about the future of al-Qaeda’s brand. 
Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri’s predictions came true by 2005. Al-Zarqawi’s gruesome 
beheadings and intense, divisive rhetoric turned “the silent majority” of Sunni’s away from al-
Zarqawi. He was soon seen as a “terrorist” throughout the Middle East, by Sunnis and Shi’a alike. 
Even al-Zarqawi’s former mentor, Maqdisi, reprimanded al-Zarqawi on a highly watched al 
Jazeera program. On the program: 
Maqdisi said that violence against civilians is wrong because it harms the interests of the umma and 
tarnishes the image of Islam. He reminded Zarqawi that so-called martyrdom operations should be 
carried out only under specific and exceptional conditions. He warned against alienating Iraqis by 
losing sight of the nature of the struggle in Iraq and forgetting that Iraqis knew what was best for 
their country.188 
 
The critique was reportedly not received well by al-Zarqawi. Yet, despite al-Zarqawi’s frustration, 
bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and Maqdisi did have a point—al-Zarqawi was losing the “hearts and 
minds” of the Iraqi people.  
 On June 7, 2006, Jordanian authorities gave a tip to United States intelligence that al-
Zarqawi was hiding near Baquba. Soon after, al-Zarqawi was killed by targeted U.S. drone strikes. 
Unfortunately for the U.S., al-Zarqawi’s legacy would live on past his death. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had 
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found its strategic basis: extreme violence against any who dared to disagree with its strict, 
doctrinal practices. This included the Americans and Israel, just like AQC was concerned, but 
AQI’s list of enemies also included the Shi’a, Christians, liberal Sunnis, and any government with 
ties to the United States or Israel. As stated by researcher Dr. Paul Kamolnick, Zarqawi’s legacy 
is “characterized by “ultra-sectarianism...[and]an unprecedented conduct of ultraviolence as a 
media-based spectacle.”189 Zarqawi believed in sectarian violence, not only to terrorize his victims, 
but as a tool to recruit new members. While, at the time of Zarqawi’s death, his strategy was not 
that popular, a rise of sectarian tension in 2006 would renew his vision. 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
 When Zarqawi was killed in 2006, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi would expand on Zarqawi’s 
sectarian legacy. Baghdadi is most well-known for transforming al-Qaeda in Iraq into the Islamic 
State. Certainly, Baghdadi’s vision to create a caliphate was iconic, and differentiated Baghdadi 
even further from al-Qaeda leadership.  
 Yet, as will become clear in this chapter, Baghdadi transformed al-Qaeda in Iraq in many 
other ways. While, like Zarqawi, Baghdadi prioritized the “near enemy,” Baghdadi targeted the 
“nearest” of the “near enemy”: kafir (infidel) citizens within Iraq and Syria.190 In this sense, 
Baghdadi went even further than Zarqawi; Baghdadi was planning to systematically exterminate 
all Shia Muslims. Baghdadi also had a doctrinal impact on his organization—he informed the 
apocalyptic and eschatological beliefs of AQI.191 These beliefs were denounced as heresy by al-
Qaeda and would be an additional factor that led to AQI and AQC’s split.192 
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 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was born by the name Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim al Badri on July 28, 
1971.193 He was born into a lower-Middle class family, that is said to have descended from the 
Prophet Muhammad.194 During his youth, Baghdadi gained the name of “The Believer” given that 
when he was not in school, he tended to be found at his local mosque.195 Baghdadi graduated from 
the University of Baghdad in 1996 and, shortly after, enrolled in the Saddam University for Islamic 
Studies in order to study Quranic recitation.196 
During his time in graduate school, Baghdadi was persuaded by an uncle to join the Muslim 
Brotherhood.197 It was there that he became exposed to Salafist thinking and he quickly “gravitated 
toward those few Salafis whose strict creed led them to call for the overthrow of rulers they 
considered betrayers of the faith.”198 One of these Salafists included Muhammad Hardan, who 
quickly became a mentor to Baghdadi. In fact, Hardan helped to inspire Baghdadi away from the 
Brotherhood and more towards jihadism. Baghdadi would soon report he felt the Brotherhood 
mainstream was composed of “people of words, not action.”199 In 1999, Baghdadi graduated from 
Saddam University with a master’s degree and a hardened outlook on the role of Islam in public 
life.200 
 In 1999, Baghdadi enrolled in a doctoral program in Quranic sciences, though left the 
program four years later to fight with the resistance against the U.S. invasion of Iraq.201 He helped 
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to found Jaysh ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamaah (Army of the People of the Sunna and Communal 
Solidarity) which fought against the U.S. coalition in Northern and Central Iraq.202 Yet, in January, 
2004, al-Baghdadi was captured by U.S. forces and detained in a prison called Camp Bucca.203  
 Camp Bucca was a transformative experience for the 33-year-old Iraqi. During his time, 
Baghdadi reportedly “led prayers, delivered sermons, and taught religious classes” to fellow 
inmates.204 Often, he would even mediate conflicts between rival groups of prisoners and negotiate 
with Camp Bucca authorities.205 These actions made Baghdadi stand out as a natural leader. To 
the 24,000 inmates at Camp Bucca, most of them Sunni, Baghdadi was a galvanizing force.206 
Because of the impact of figures like Baghdadi, one BBC journalist described the camp as a 
“university” for jihadists.207 Another Brookings journalist details that “if they weren’t jihadists 
when they arrived, many of them were by the time they left.”208 It was in Camp Bucca that 
Baghdadi created many future members of the Islamic State. After 10 months in prison, Baghdadi 
was released, though the jihadi networks would remain long after his release.209 
 Upon leaving prison, Baghdadi called a relative in al-Qaeda. With the help of an al-Qaeda 
spokesman, Baghdadi was convinced to go to Damascus, Syria, in order to help in al-Qaeda’s 
cause. Baghdadi was tasked with “ensuring that AQI’s online propaganda was in line with its brand 
of ultraconservative Islam.”210 His role as a media strategist would leave a big impact on 
Baghdadi’s conception of the jihad struggle. Like his predecessor, Baghdadi understood the 
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importance of waging jihad both physically and ideologically. By seeing AQI’s social media 
apparatus up close and personal, Baghdadi would continue on to establish a robust media strategy 
for his future organization, ISIS. 
 Baghdadi slowly crept his way up the AQI hierarchy, a process that was accelerated after 
he received a PHD in Quranic Sciences.211 At the same time, al-Qaeda in Iraq was reorganizing 
itself after the death of Zarqawi. The group was rebranded as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).212 
With renewed spiritual credentials and ISI in need of leadership, Baghdadi was appointed to the 
Islamic State’s Sharia Committee in 2007.213 He also caught the attention of Abu Ayyub al-Masri, 
ISI’s Minister of War, who appointed Baghdadi to the eleven-man Consultative Committee.214 
Baghdadi’s leadership roles did not end there—Baghdadi soon became a member of an even more 
powerful group, a panel of three men called the Coordination Committee.215 All three positions 
were prestigious honors, allowing Baghdadi to control much of the ISI network. He could now 
“select, supervise and fire the Islamic State’s commanders in the group’s Iraqi provinces” and was 
in charge of “coordinating[ing] communication between the Islamic State’s top leaders and their 
provincial representatives.”216 Al-Baghdadi, in only a few years, had amassed a significant amount 
of power.  
 On April 18, 2010, Baghdadi would have another stroke of luck. ISI’s leader, Abu Umar 
al-Baghdadi and his deputy, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, were killed in a U.S. raid.217 This meant that 
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Baghdadi, formerly ISI’s number three commander, inherited the Islamic State in Iraq and all that 
came with it.218 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now just thirty-nine years old, was in control. 
  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s leadership would come to represent a meaningful change in the 
organization. For one, ISI was now being run by Iraqi members of the Islamic State, rather than 
foreign fighters who had been trained in Afghanistan.219 Al-Baghdadi welcomed in former 
prisoners from Camp Bucca and many former military or intelligence officers of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime.220 These men were highly skilled fighters, thereby increasing the fighting 
capabilities. Moreover, their Iraqi pedigrees meant that ISI could attract greater community 
support which it had lost towards the end of 2006. 
 Yet, al-Baghdadi’s leadership also represented another major change within Islamic State 
leadership. Hajj Bakr, the head of ISI’s military council, purged anyone who challenged 
Baghdadi’s authority.221 Bakr’s legacy for eliminating al-Baghdadi’s rivals even awarded Bakr the 
nickname, the “prince of shadows.”222 Al-Baghdadi was ensuring that all of the Islamic State 
operatives shared his hardline, Salafist world view. 
 As would come to pass, however, al-Baghdadi had trouble incorporating the Syrian 
offshoot of ISI, Jubhat al-Nusra. In 2011, al-Baghdadi deployed Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, a 
Syrian jihadist who had traveled to Iraq to resist the U.S. occupation, to create Jabhat al-Nusra 
 
218 “Timeline: The Life and Death.”; Importantly, the rise to power of al-Baghdadi was not immediate. After the 
death of Abu Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayyab al-Masri, bin Laden instructed the Consultative Council to, 
“appoint an interim leader and to send him a list of candidates for emir [prince] and their qualifications.” Yet, this 
obviously never happened. The head of ISI’s military council, Hajji Bakr, let the Consultative Council go to a vote. 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was approved 9-2. [McCants, “The Believer.”] 
219 McCants, “The Believer.” 
220 Ibid.; “Who Was Abu Bakr.” 




(JN) and “wage jihad against the Alawite government.”223 While initially, JN followed al-
Baghdadi’s playbook, it soon became clear that, like AQI, JN was developing a rebellious streak. 
From the outset, al-Jolani and al-Baghdadi quarreled over leadership. Al-Baghdadi was 
desperate to announce ISI’s presence in Syria, but al-Jolani, claiming that JN’s mandate was 
provided by al-Zawahiri, cited al-Zawahiri’s ban on officially announcing that al-Qaeda was 
interfering with Syria.224 Al-Jolani began to officially defy al-Baghdadi’s repeated orders to 
announce al-Nusra as part of ISI and al-Baghdadi began to search for a way to undermine al-
Jolani.225 Al-Baghdadi was particularly bothered by the fact that al-Jolani pledged baya to al-
Qaeda’s new leader, al-Zawahiri.226 Al-Baghdadi and al-Jolani’s personal rifts would continue for 
two years, however, before the men would reach their breaking point. 
In 2013, tensions boiled over. In April, without consulting al-Jolani, al-Baghdadi declared 
that ISI was expanding its operations into Syria and absorbing al-Nusra—which, he claimed, had 
always been a part of ISI.227 Al-Baghdadi also rebranded his new organization the Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). To gain leverage against al-Baghdadi, al-Jolani pledged his formal 
support to AQC. 
Al-Jolani’s strategy was marginally successful; while al-Zawahiri maintained that ISIS 
would remain al-Qaeda’s representative in Iraq, he ruled that JN was separate from ISIS and was 
al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria.228 Al-Zawahiri also declared that ISIS should return to the Iraq front 
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so that JN could maintain hegemony over Iraqi operations.229 Predictably, al-Zawahiri’s decree 
was poorly received by al-Baghdadi, who rejected the ruling on political and religious grounds.  
As will come to be clear in the next chapter, this argument over leadership ultimately led 
to the official break between ISIS and al-Qaeda. In February of 2014, the rift between ISIS and al-
Qaeda became official when al-Zawahiri officially announced that al-Qaeda was no longer linked 
to ISIS.230 The announcement led to significant infighting, not only between ISIS and AQC 
members, but also, predictably, between ISIS and JN members. 
Al-Baghdadi’s group ultimately won the struggle and consolidated much of Eastern Syria. 
As al-Baghdadi expanded his territory, so too did he expand his brutal treatment of Shi’a and Sunni 
dissenters. As terrorism specialist William McCants describes, “Baghdadi viewed imposing the 
harsh religious laws as a way of legitimizing his new state as ‘Islamic,’ and terrifying the local 
population into submission. Like Saddam, he understood the political utility of brutality in the 
name of religion.”231 Baghdadi soon captured western Iraq, and, by June 2014, he was able to even 
take over Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city.232 By the end of June, the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria officially declared itself a caliphate and Baghdadi its caliph. 
Throughout 2014 and 2015, many reports emerged that claimed Baghdadi had been killed 
in U.S. airstrikes.233 Nonetheless, Baghdadi would re-emerge after each report, frustrating his 
American opponents. Over the course of the next few years, the U.S. coalition would be successful 
in slowly re-taking ISIS controlled territory. It was not until October 26, 2019 that Baghdadi was 
killed during a U.S. Special Operations raid.234 
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It is difficult to interpret Baghdadi’s legacy because he embodies a host of contradictions. 
Baghdadi will forever be remembered as one of jihadism’s most famous violent sectarians. 
Nonetheless, by successfully creating a caliphate, Baghdadi helped to unify Sunni Iraqis against a 
perceived external threat. Yet, what is most important about Baghdadi and that which is often 
missing from efforts to analyze Baghdadi’s impact, was his role in fostering the media structures 
of ISIS. Like his predecessors, Baghdadi was conscious of and deliberate in creating a media 
apparatus that would help to advance his political goals. The following chapters will explore just 
















CHAPTER TWO: ORIGIN of al-QAEDA 
“People are supposed to be innocent until proven guilty. Well not the Afghan fighters. They are 
the ‘terrorists of the world.’ But pushing them against the wall will do nothing except increase the 
terrorism.” 
- Osama Bin Laden 
Al-Qaeda’s Early History 
 As the last chapter made clear, a host of historical factors led to the rise of al-Qaeda. 
Between the failure of the US’ “twin pillars” policies, the seizure of the Kaaba by jihadists, and 
the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, jihadists in the Middle East were now emboldened to 
a new form of global jihad. In combining historical precedent with the rise of al-Qaeda a key, often 
overlooked feature of al-Qaeda becomes clear—al-Qaeda emerged as an idea rather than a formal 
organization. Such a concept is furthered by specialist Dr. Paul Kamolnick who refers to al-Qaeda 
as the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO). Dr. Kamolnick derives his classification of “organization” 
from bin Laden’s own description of the group as the “Base of the Jihad Organization” (Tanzim 
Qa’idat al-Jihad). In his assessment, Dr. Kamolnick is likely drawing from other scholars as well. 
For example, Olivier Roy describes al-Qaeda as a “brand name” and John A. Turner describes al-
Qaeda as an “ideology.”235 In essence, al-Qaeda is not the highly coherent group that its colloquial 
image entails; al-Qaeda is a collection of diversely oriented organizations. 
 Despite the group’s significant affiliation with bin Laden, al-Qaeda is incorrectly thought 
to have been named by Abdallah Azzam. After realizing that the Soviets were planning to 
withdraw from Afghanistan in 1988, Azzam did not want to disband the organization he had 
created. Azzam was killed in the car bombing a year later, bringing bin Laden into power. 
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At the time, Azzam’s death represented a major shift in the al-Qaeda movement for two 
reasons. First, Bin Laden, having been eclipsed by Azzam, now was able to prioritize his own 
world view.236 Chiefly, bin Laden did not want to focus his fight against corrupt Muslim 
leadership, instead focused on reconquesting former Islamic territory and the new ultimate target, 
the Western occupiers. Bin Laden’s conception of jihad had been shaped from the Afghanistan 
struggle. Unlike Azzam, bin Laden looked beyond Afghanistan, attempting to diagnose a larger 
problem within the Middle East. As is evident from bin Laden’s attacks, bin Laden was focused 
on “the head of the [infidel] snake,” or the United States.237 Bin Laden believed that, because the 
mujahideen successfully beat back the Soviet Invasion in 1979, a similar defeat could occur 
through terrorist attacks against the United States. Only after the U.S. had been defeated could al-
Qaeda reposition its attacks against despotic Arab regimes. 
The second major change of Azzam’s death was a reorientation of funding. Prior to the 
withdrawal of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Azzam’s own organization, the Services Bureau, 
was funded by the Saudis and Americans.238 During the final months prior to Azzam’s death, bin 
Laden had transferred significant funding from the Services Bureau to al-Qaeda.239 Now, with the 
funding drying up and the former link to substantial funds deceased, bin Laden had to look 
elsewhere. 
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According to some sources, al-Qaeda was able to live on due to funding from their 
operations in Sudan. Apparently, the Sudanese government looked the other way when bin Laden 
was undertaking construction projects, as the construction projects provided a much-needed 
investment into a depleted Sudanese economy.240 Such a point has been highly contested. As 
written in Greg Bruno’s CFR Report, “Al Qaeda’s Financial Pressures,” “by the time bin Laden 
arrived in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, he had been squeezed of his potential inheritance in Saudi 
Arabia and stripped of personal assets from Sudan.”241 Moreover, a Staff Report to the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States found that “contrary to common belief, 
Bin Ladin did not have access to any significant amounts of personal wealth (particularly after his 
move from Sudan to Afghanistan) and did not personally fund al Qaeda, either through an 
inheritance or businesses he was said to have owned in Sudan.”242 According to these sources, the 
question of how al-Qaeda was able to live on past the death of Azzam and the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan remains. 
However, these sources do not paint the whole picture. It is important to delineate the 
wealth that bin Laden amassed prior to his Saudi citizen being revoked in 1994 and after 1994.  
Before 1994, it was not as though bin Laden was “strapped for cash.” According to American 
investigators, bin Laden received a $1 million annual allowance from his family from between 
1970 to 1994.243 Not to mention, salaries for al-Qaeda members during bin Laden’s time in Sudan 
were quite high; salaries for al-Qaeda members ranged from $500 to $1,200 per month.244 For 
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somewhere between a thousand to two thousand al-Qaeda members in Sudan, let alone al-Qaeda 
members still operating in Afghanistan, the salaries certainly added up.245 
After 1994, Greg Bruno’s CFR report and the Staff Report to the National Commission 
certainly hold more credence. According to a former al-Qaeda member, by the end of the 1994 
salaries for group members were cut and “bin Laden [said] there [was] no money and he lost all 
the money.”246 Moreover, when Saudi Arabia revoked bin Laden’s citizenship in 1994, they 
subsequently froze his assets in the Kingdom, meaning that bin Laden could only rely on his 
present business dealings.247 Two years later, when bin Laden was expelled from Sudan, he was 
again forced to leave behind investments. According to a source interviewed by journalist Peter L. 
Bergen, bin Laden lost as much as $150 million between his expulsion from Saudi Arabia and 
Sudan.248 
 There are two primary methods that such officials used to raise money for a nubile al-
Qaeda that was now struggling for funding. First, al-Qaeda operatives utilized charitable 
organizations as covers for funding. Zakat, a compulsory Islamic tax on income, and sadaqah, a 
voluntary contribution, are often made to charities anonymously, meaning that these monetary 
contributions often have little oversight.249 Notably, many of the organizations thought to have ties 
to al-Qaeda funding are headquartered in Saudi Arabia. These include: the International Islamic 
Relief Organization (IIRO), the Benevolence International Foundation, the al Haramian Islamic 
Foundation, Blessed Relief (Muwafaq) Foundation, and the Rabita Trust.250 From this list, four of 
the names particularly stand out—the Muwafaq Foundation, the IIRO, Benevolence International, 
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and the Rabita Trust—given that all were thought to be sources of funding for the mujahideen in 
Afghanistan.251 According to a CIA report “funds raised through the International Islamic Relief 
Organization were used to support at least six Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan prior to 
9/11.” FBI records also support CIA findings that the IIRO and Muslim World League worked in 
tandem with bin Laden to fund his activities in Afghanistan.252 These contributions were by no 
means insignificant; a Saudi government audit on its largest bank, the National Commercial Bank, 
demonstrated that $3 million flowed from Saudi accounts to bin Laden.253 
Outside of charitable contributions, bin Laden and his contemporaries were able to keep 
al-Qaeda financially alive through another source: businesses. As earlier suggested, the links 
between Sudanese business dealings and al-Qaeda funding are ambiguous; it is currently unclear 
as to whether bin Laden’s business dealings during his refuge in Sudan were profitable or that bin 
Laden was able to use this money for the financing of al-Qaeda operations. However, there still is 
some evidence that bin Laden and his contemporaries were able to run businesses that funneled 
money and arms to al-Qaeda.254 For instance, in 1993, the CIA received an intelligence report that 
“bin Laden’s businesses had begun to ship cash to Egyptian Islamists for printing presses and 
weapons.”255 Bin Laden was also recorded to wire $210,00 to contacts in Texas for a private jet 
that would smuggle weapons between Pakistan and Sudan.256 And, much to the chagrin of 
Egyptian authorities, bin Laden bought camels “to smuggle guns through the desert to Egypt.”257 
While these intelligence reports are limited in their understanding of bin Laden’s activities, they 
suggest that, in part, the money bin Laden made during his time in Sudan helped to fund al-Qaeda 
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activities. By 1996, a rare public statement by the CIA declared bin laden as “one of the most 
significant financial sponsors of Islamic extremist activities in the world.”258 
Building a Global Reputation 
While al-Qaeda was flying under the radar of international intelligence services in the 
1980s and early 1990s, bin Laden was keen in building a global reputation. In addition to physical 
recruitment efforts, bin Laden was fundamentally interested in building up the al-Qaeda “brand.” 
In the beginning, however, many of these efforts were looked upon with disdain by Azzam. 
 The media campaign began after the Battle of Jaji, the battle in which Osama bin Laden’s 
compound was attacked by a Soviet air campaign. As earlier suggested, this battle was 
fundamental in building up bin Laden’s own warrior reputation among Arab jihadists. After the 
fighting subsided, bin Laden created a fifty-minute video that “showed him riding horses, talking 
to Arab volunteers, broadcasting on the radio, firing weapons.”259 Videos were even taken during 
the raid itself, and included shots of executions of Russians.260 Bin Laden also began to seek out 
Arab journalists to spread word to other Arab recruits.261 Stories began to percolate throughout the 
Arab World of bin Laden’s battlefield exploits.  
While bin Laden was extraordinary in spreading his messages to the Arab world, Azzam 
grew frustrated. In fact, this media strategy was the first sign of trouble between the two men; 
Azzam felt that bin Laden was no longer as focused on supporting the mujahideen as bin Laden 
was focused on building up an Arab fighting coalition. 
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Yet, after Azzam’s death in 1989, bin Laden continued to pontificate to the Arab World 
without reservations. When the Saudi family angered bin Laden by allowing U.S. troops onto 
Saudi soil during the First Gulf War, bin Laden responded with a major media campaign against 
the Kingdom. Bin Laden worked with two young Islamist preachers known as the “Awakening 
Sheikhs” who “recorded anti-American sermons on cassette tapes and circulated millions of copies 
around the kingdom in late 1990 and early 1991.”262 Bin Laden also began delivering lectures 
around Jedda mosques and circulating the anti-American cassette tapes. Bin Laden’s efforts 
culminated in the “Letter of Demands,” a letter addressed to King Fahd, which included dozens of 
signatures of other Islamists. According to researcher Steve Coll, “For the first time the CIA began 
to see evidence that Arab jihadists trained in Afghanistan posed a threat in Saudi Arabia itself.”263 
Bin Laden was beginning to make a name for himself as a key jihadist and Islamist. 
Ironically, even though Azzam did not intend to recruit Arabs to the anti-US campaign that 
bin Laden was keen on expanding, Azzam’s speeches had an impact for years to come. The most 
prominent example of the radicalizing impact of Azzam’s speeches is demonstrated by a Kuwaiti 
man named Ramzi Yousef. As a teenager, Yousef was exposed to the “fiery sermons about the 
Afghan jihad” of Abdullah Azzam.264 Yousef also often listened to underground cassette tapes, 
read of Azzam in newspapers, and read pamphlets on the Afghani jihad.265 In 1990, Yousef entered 
a Arab camp in Afghanistan, Khalden, where he trained for about six months.266 Two years later, 
in 1992, Yousef moved to New York where he connected with Islamists that had trained in 
Peshawar with Azzam. On February 26, 1993, Yousef attempted to blow up the World Trade 
Center.  
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By Yousef’s standards, the attack was unsuccessful. He had hoped to cause about 250,000 
deaths, whilst only ended up killing six and wounding one thousand.267 The attack also caused 
over $500 million in damage.268 After the attack, Yousef disappeared to Pakistan, where, after 
many months later, it was uncovered he was hiding in al-Beit al-Shuhadaa (“House of the 
Martyrs”), a Pakistani guest house funded by bin Laden. 
Yousef’s attack signaled to the world that the United States was not invulnerable from 
jihadi terror attacks. Moreover, it serves as a potent reminder to readers just how impactful Azzam 
and bin Laden’s message could be. Even though Azzam did not intend to recruit jihadis to bin 
Laden’s Arab-centered cause, Azzam’s work inspired the first major terror attack by this new wave 
of jihadis on Western soil.  
1993 was a big year for al-Qaeda’s morale. Just eight months after the World Trade 
incident, al-Qaeda-trained Somalis helped to down a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter. The event would 
infamously become known as the Battle of Mogadishu, or the Black Hawk Down incident. In a 
1996 interview with Peter L. Bergen, bin Laden officially claimed that his group was affiliated 
with the attack stating, “With Allah’s grace, Muslims in Somalia cooperated with some Arab holy 
warriors who were in Afghanistan.”269 Bergen continues to describe, “For bin Laden, Somalia was 
clearly an intoxicating victory. He exulted in the fact that the United States withdrew its troops 
from the country, pointing to the withdrawal as an example of the ‘weakness, frailty and cowardice 
of the U.S. troops.’”270 Clearly, Somalia was a major tactical win for al-Qaeda, demonstrating their 
potential to strike the U.S. via regional proxies. Even former Senator Bob Kerrey, who served on 
the 9/11 commission, admitted, “It is true that al Qaeda was emboldened by 1993—it was their 
 
267 Ibid, 250. 
268 Ibid, 250 




first successful attack on us.”271 While the links to al-Qaeda were not publicized until three years 
after the attack, the Black Hawk Down incident certainly inflated al-Qaeda’s confidence. 
There is also some evidence that, during the early 1990s when bin Laden was in exile in 
Sudan, bin Laden was still working on recruiting Arabs to his nascent al-Qaeda organization. For 
one count, bin Laden “fashioned himself as a lecturer-businessman,” often preaching at mosques 
in Khartoum.272 During the early 1990s, bin Laden helped to form the Committee for Advice and 
Reform (ARC, or Hayat al-Nasiha w’al-Islah) and the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate 
Rights (CDLR, or Lajnat al-Difa’ ‘an al-Huquq al-Shar’iyya)273. These groups “were active in 
faxing letters of opposition to Saudi Arabia and popularizing Islamist dissent in Saudi Arabia to 
the English-speaking world.”274 Moreover, as earlier recorded, bin Laden was buying weapons and 
printing presses from Islamists in Egypt. The detail of the printing presses is notable, as it indicates 
that bin Laden placed equal importance on the acquisition of physical weaponry as he did on the 
tools for the dissemination of the jihadist ideology. In other words, while he was in Sudan, bin 
Laden was just as concerned with spreading jihad through propaganda as he was on training new 
recruits. 
On August 23, 1996, bin Laden infamously declared war on the West. This “Declaration 
of Jihad against the Americans occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries” or “Ladenese 
Epistle” was issued after bin Laden’s expulsion from Sudan.275 The speech was translated into 
various languages and distributed on audio cassettes. Of notable help in carrying the message was 
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the CDLR London branch, which disseminated bin Laden’s message to British newspapers.276 Bin 
Laden’s 1996 speech was of particular importance, as it is one of the first documents in which he 
labels the United Nations and United States as potential targets. 
Later in 1996, in November, Osama bin Laden was interviewed by Nida’ul Islam, an 
Australian journal edited by Muslim Activists. This interview is often overlooked as a key 
doctrinal text; however, for the purposes of al-Qaeda’s popularization, this interview is crucial. As 
described by scholar Bruce Lawrence, this interview “can be regarded as an indication of bin 
Laden’s efforts to expand media coverage of his appeal for a global jihad.”277 This is due to two 
key features: (1) the interview’s publication in Australia represents the global reach bin Laden 
strove to gain; and (2) bin Laden specifically notes transgressions of the global community against 
Muslims in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon, demonstrating how bin Laden sees his reach 
as not isolated to a singular Muslim struggle. This is important in further delineating bin Laden’s 
ideology from his predecessor, Abdallah Azzam. Again, we notice that bin Laden is less focused 
on Afghanistan than he is on a pan-Islamic struggle against Western forces and “despotic” Muslim 
governments. 
Bin Laden’s efforts to reach global news did not stop with his 1996 speeches; in March 
1997 Bin Laden met with CNN reporter Peter Arnett. The visit was arranged by ARC and Arnett’s 
colleague Peter Bergen.278 According to Bergen, when speaking with the ARC representative, 
Khaled al-Fawwaz, Khaled was initially interested in broadcasting the interview on CBS. 
However, once Khaled learned that CNN broadcasted to hundreds of countries and CBS was only 
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shown in the US, Khaled decided to choose CNN.279 This decision, yet again, demonstrates al-
Qaeda’s desire to reach the widest audience possible. 
When Arnett inquired about bin Laden’s future plans, bin Laden responded with a chilling 
statement: “You’ll see them and hear about them in the media, God willing (inshallah).”280 As 
would come to pass, the media did indeed pick up on al-Qaeda activities just under one year later. 
“The Second Wave of Global Jihad”281 
While, throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, bin Laden was incomparable in 
spreading the word of jihad throughout the world, his rhetoric notably shifted in 1998. Even when 
bin Laden criticized the United States in his 1996 “Declaration of Jihad,” he equally criticized the 
Saudi government for its actions in Kuwait and Yemen. Such a point is illuminated by scholar 
Glenn E. Robinson who writes, “this was not, strictly speaking, a ‘far enemy’ document. Bin Laden 
reserved equal disdain for the Saudi monarchy and the quisling Muslim clerics who allowed the 
monarchy to run roughshod over Islam.”282 Robinson’s note reminds us that even in 1996, bin 
Laden was primarily operating under a “near enemy” doctrine.  
This all changed on February 23, 1998 with bin Laden’s first and only fatwa, “The World 
Islamic Front.” Remarkably, bin Laden never had the religious credentials to issue a fatwa, nor to 
refer to himself as a sheikh, which he does in the fatwa’s signatory. Additionally, bin Laden does 
not gain religious credentials simply by citing fatawa (multiple fatwa) of other scholars in his own 
speech. Yet this fatwa is more significant for reasons other than it being an utter embarrassment to 
bin Laden’s credibility as a religious leader. Most notably, the fatwa focuses on the U.S. 
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“occupation” of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. sanctions on Iraq, and Israel’s occupation of Islam’s third 
holiest mosque.283 As again described by Robinson, “No longer is the Saudi regime or any other 
apostate near-enemy regime equally responsible for these travails. Rather, they are now powerless 
to stop the American occupation and aggression.”284 The 1998 fatwa is, thus, a clear example of 
the “far enemy” doctrine.  
It is also important to note that bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa had major political implications. 
As Zawahiri co-signed the fatwa, this effectively declared that Zawahiri’s al-Jihad al-Islami 
organization was now linked with al-Qaeda.285 Other co-signers of the document included Abu 
Yasir Rif’ai Ahmad Taha of the Egyptian Islamic Group (al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya), Sheikh Mir 
Hamzah secretary of Jamiat e Ulema of Pakistan, and Fazlur Rahman, amir (prince) of the Jihad 
Movement in Bangladesh.286 Thus, al-Qaeda formalized its ties to global jihadi parties, 
representing its new global strategy.  
Finally, bin Laden’s fatwa had deep religious implications by not delineating between 
American civilians and the U.S. military. The fatwa states: 
With God’s permission we call on everyone who believes in God and wants reward to comply with 
His will to kill the Americans and seize their money wherever and whenever they find them. We 
also call on religious scholars, their leaders, their youth, and their soldiers, to launch the raid on the 
soldiers of Satan, the Americans, and whichever devil’s supporters are allied with them, to rout 
those behind them so they will not forget them.287 
 
In bin Laden’s provocative language, he suggests that all Americans, civilian or military, are at 
fault for America’s sins. As earlier indicated, this represents a major delineation from the thousand 
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years of Muslim history, which clearly makes it haram (forbidden) to target women and 
children.288 
 Bin Laden and his growing al-Qaeda organization got a major publicity bump in 1998 not 
just from his fatwa. On August 7th, two truck bombs were set off at U.S. embassies in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya.289 During the bombings, twelve Americans and 212 
Africans were killed.290 Four thousand more were injured.291 The scenes were horrific. According 
to Kenyan diplomat, Prudence Bushnell, “This huge procession of people who were bleeding all 
over one another. There was blood everywhere on the bannister. I could feel someone bleeding on 
my hair and back.”292 As put by the U.S. lawyer prosecuting the embassy bombers, Patrick 
Fitzgerald, “The lucky are blinded and the unlucky are dead.”293 
The attacks were a major success for al-Qaeda, not only because the assailants succeeded 
in massacring affiliates of U.S. foreign policy, but also because of the way that the attacks could 
be used to bolster al-Qaeda’s reputation. For one count, the attacks solidified al-Qaeda’s reputation 
as religiously legitimate. Al-Qaeda named the Tanzania attack Operation al-Aqsa—a reference to 
a Jerusalem mosque controlled by Israel, the third holiest site in Islam.294 Al-Qaeda called the 
Kenya attack the Holy Kaaba operation—a reference to the holiest site in Islam.295 The attacks 
were also set between 10:30 and 11 AM on a Friday (juma’a), the most observant day of the week 
for practicing Muslims.296 It is during this time on Fridays that observant Muslims would be 
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worshipping at their mosques, which means that al-Qaeda was purposely trying to minimize the 
casualties of “innocent” Muslims. Al-Qaeda proved itself shrewd in its calculations; by not 
avoiding Muslim casualties, al-Qaeda could reinforce its Islamic credentials, albeit a twisted sense 
of Islam. 
In addition to reinforcing al-Qaeda’s righteous reputation, the embassy bombings 
contributed to bin Laden’s growing media strategy. In fact, three months before the mission, 
Muhammad Rashed al-’Owhali, a conspirator in the Kenya bombings, was not simply briefed on 
his mission. Al-’Owhali was also the main subject of a video “in which he declared himself a 
martyr on behalf of the ‘Army of Liberation of the Islamic Holy Lands.’”297 This video, in addition 
to Bin Laden’s May fatwa, began to circulate extensively after the bombings, leading to the 
popularization of al-Qaeda’s message. 
When the video of al-’Owhali surfaced soon after the embassy attacks, it quickly became 
clear that bin Laden was behind the embassy bombings. The life stories of the attackers were also 
a clear hint. Al-’Owhali was known to devour magazines and books about jihad, including the 
Jihad magazine published by the Services Office. He was trained at al-Qaeda’s Khaldan camp in 
Afghanistan, where he learned how to conduct attacks on American military bases and embassies. 
Tanzania’s bombing conspirator, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, also trained in Afghanistan. While 
he never met bin Laden, he learned about bin Laden’s calls for attacks against the U.S. from CNN 
and BBC. Combined, the Afghani al-Qaeda camps and media coverage of bin Laden helped to 
radicalize these two men. Both men admitted that senior al-Qaeda operatives were the directors of 
their attacks. 
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With bin Laden’s fingerprints all over the lives of the Tanzanian and Kenyan bombers, it 
was clear that bin Laden was behind the attacks. As noted by scholar Bruce Lawrence, “These 
were the first terrorist actions that could unequivocally be connected to bin Laden.”298 Bin Laden 
may have never explicitly given instructions to the Kenya embassy bombers, but there was no 
doubt that al-Qaeda trained and inspired these embassy bombers.299 At this moment, it became 
clear that bin Laden was not only a financier of terrorism directed towards the United States, but 
bin Laden was also a strategist of this new wave jihadi terrorism. 
 The question for the US, at this point, as no longer who planned the bombings but how to 
react. On August 8th, a day after the bombing, intelligence officers received reports that there was 
to be a meeting of senior members of terrorist groups on August 20th.300 Bin Laden was thought 
to be among the potential attendees. So, on August 20th, Clinton launched seventy-five Tomahawk 
cruise missiles at Zawahar, Pakistan, the site of the terrorists’ meeting.301 The mission was known 
as Operation Infinite Reach.302 While twenty-one Pakistani jihadists died and dozens were 
wounded, bin Laden was not among the casualties. The mission was a resounding embarrassment 
to the Clinton presidency.303 
 Together, the embassy bombings and the American’s failure to assassinate bin Laden 
served as a massive publicity stunt for al-Qaeda. While Clinton faced criticism back home, bin 
Laden was celebrated amongst jihadists in the Arab world. As stated by expert Steve Coll, “Bin 
Laden’s reputation in the Islamic world had been enhanced...The missile strikes were his biggest 
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publicity payoff to date.”304 After the unsuccessful U.S. strikes, bin Laden gave his first interview 
to the Qatari Arab news outlet, al Jazeera, which lasted a full ninety minutes.305 By late 1999, the 
CIA’s Counterterrorist Center calculated that al-Qaeda operated in more than sixty countries.306 
Al-Qaeda had become a brand name that spoke to Muslims in nearly every language throughout 
the entire globe. 
 In addition to al-Qaeda’s own propaganda of the event, Western media played a significant 
role in amplifying al-Qaeda’s voice. A study on this very topic found that, “In 2000, for example, 
CBS News and NBC News broadcast significantly more stories mentioning bin Laden than 
segments referring to Great Britain’s prime minister, Tony Blaire and Germany’s chancellor, 
Gerhard Schroder. ABC News presented the same number of stories mentioning bin Laden and 
Blair, far fewer to Schroder”307 Importantly, this played right into bin Laden’s hands; by 
emphasizing an “us vs. them” narrative, Western media re-emphasized bin Laden’s own message. 
Bin Laden, both through his own efforts and through his portrayal on media, had become 
larger than life. A Pakistani cleric described at the time that bin Laden had become “a symbol for 
the whole Islamic world against all those outside powers who were trying to crush Muslims. He is 
the courageous one who raised his voice against them. He’s a hero to us, but it is America that first 
made him a hero.”308 Bin Laden’s dream of creating a Muslim coalition to fight the far enemy had 
been realized. He had inspired a small minority of the Muslim world that would soon join his 
fighting force. 
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Even two decades after the 9/11 attacks, it remains difficult to analyze the antecedents and 
consequences of 9/11 given the immense ongoing trauma as a result of the day. Yet, it is important 
to unpack how part of that trauma has roots both in the context which inspired the 9/11 attacks and 
in the media spectacle that 9/11 became. This is not to overlook the real trauma experienced from 
9/11; but rather, to pay homage to it by better understanding how collective trauma was an 
intentional strategy on the part of bin Laden. 
 First, it is important to not forget the context in which these growing attacks were situated 
against American forces. While al-Qaeda grew its connections throughout the world, it was in 
Afghanistan where new recruits were turned into soldiers. Al-Qaeda capitalized on anti-American 
aggression that stemmed from perceptions of the U.S. as an occupying force in the Middle East. 
The growing number of attacks that were linked to the United States’ military actions were a blind 
spot for American intelligence officials. “Clinton and his Small Group gave relatively little 
attention to the Afghanistan context from which the embassy bombings arose,” argued Steve Coll 
in his analysis of U.S. missteps following the bombings.309 Rather than trying to understand the 
connection between the historical context from which al-Qaeda came into being and the present-
day actions of the Pentagon, Clinton and his advisors were far more concerned with the immediate 
issues: finding bin Laden and punishing him for his actions. Clinton’s administration was not 
worried about creating more terrorists in the process; in Clinton’s mind, al-Qaeda had hit the U.S., 
so the U.S. had to hit back harder. 
Not to mention, al-Qaeda continued to use the media to contextualize and popularize the 
9/11 attack. The Summer prior to 9/11, a one-hundred-minute recruitment tape emerged in which 
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bin Laden crowed, “Blood, blood, and destruction, destruction...We give you the good news that 
the forces of Islam are coming.”310 In early June, bin Laden set up an interview in which he claimed 
“there would be attacks against American and Israeli facilities within the next several weeks.”311 
It was clear that a plan was in motion, but to intelligence analysts who were only beginning to 
grasp the depths of al-Qaeda’s prolific media strategy, that plan was far from being recognized. 
By mid-July, all nineteen of the attackers were in the United States. Nearly all of them 
visited Afghanistan for the first time in 1999 or 2000, again reflecting the significance of 
Afghanistan as a central point for weaponization of jihadis.312 Moreover, while fifteen of the 
attackers were Saudi, two were from the U.A.E., one was from Egypt, and another was from 
Lebanon.313 The nineteen men from different nationalities had come together for a multinational 
cause, or perhaps, what could be described as a supranational cause. Like bin Laden, the men all 
shared a belief that they should target the head of the snake. In fact, early September was chosen 
after the attackers realized that Congress would be in session.314 Their key targets would be sitting 
ducks, or so bin Laden’s men thought. 
 At 8:45 AM on September 11th, an American Airlines Boeing 767 crashed into the 80th 
floor of the World Trade Center’s north tower.315 18 minutes later, another Boeing 767 hit the 60th 
floor of the south tower. Both planes had roughly 20,000 gallons of jet fuel, making them highly 
explosive.316 Hundreds were killed due to the impact of the planes, but many more were killed by 
inferno caused by the massive amount of jet fuel in the planes. Then, at 10 AM, the South Tower 
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began to collapse. Half an hour later, the North Tower collapsed. In total, the Twin Tower attacks 
left 2,763 dead 317 
 The Twin Towers, though most remembered, were not the only targets of the 9/11 attacks. 
At 9:45 AM, American Airlines Flight 77 struck the Pentagon, the U.S. military headquarters, 
killing 189 military personnel and civilians. Yet another flight, United Flight 93, was likely headed 
to Congress, based on the auspicious timing of events. This flight departed late, giving those on 
the plane time to get news of the first plane crashing into the Twin Towers. Thus, when the plane 
was taken over, the passengers fought back. Although all forty-four people aboard were killed, 
their actions prevented al-Qaeda from celebrating a total victory. Unfortunately for the U.S., 
Osama bin Laden had taken the lives of 2,977 people and injured 6,000 more.318  
 Yet, to bin Laden, it was not just the death toll that was significant; rather, it was the 
symbolism of the attacks. As argued by researcher Lisa Finnegan in No Questions Asked: News 
Coverage Since 9/11, “the press promoted fear after 9/11, bought into the assumptions of the Bush 
Administration’s war, and then largely reproduced the Administration’s lies and propaganda.”319 
It was exactly the same “us and them” message that Osama bin Laden had wanted to create. In 
fact, in the book Reflections in a Longshot Eye by journalist Lawrence Pintak, Pintak argues that 
Bush and Osama bin Laden’s rhetoric and worldview discursively mirror each other.320 Bin Laden 
effectively heightened the polarization, reinforcing his own perspective that the U.S. and Muslims 
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were at war. The Western media’s repeated coverage of the towers falling in the days following 
the attacks did little to better educate the Western viewers. Instead, Western media coverage simply 
played into bin Laden’s own hands. 
In pitting Islam and the West against one another, bin Laden helped to recruit to his own 
cause, leading to an upsurge in recruitment after 9/11. As President Bush infamously said on 
September 21st, “You are Either With Us, or with the Terrorists.”321 On October 7th, bin Laden 
indirectly replied, “I tell you that these events have split the entire world into two camps: one of 
faith, with no hypocrites, and one of unbelief—may God protect us from it.”322 What were bin 
Laden and President Bush trying to do but convince the world to join their side? Their strategies 
were the same; denounce their opponent to attract the attention of their intended proponents. Bin 
Laden was speaking to Muslims and President Bush was trying to speak to other powerful nations, 
but each man was advertising.  
As readers will understand in the next chapter, the torch of takfirism would become 
emblematic of al-Qaeda in Iraq, better known today as ISIS. The work to galvanize Arabs in 
Afghanistan would be brought to Iraq and, with it, would go al-Qaeda’s divisive propaganda 
machine. Importantly, the impact of takfirism was not limited to the Western target; Bin Laden 
utilized takfirism to target Shi’a, liberal Sunnis, Christians, and Jews. Bin Laden’s decades-long 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RISE AND FALL OF al- QAEDA in IRAQ (AQI) 
“Al-Zarqawi was not buying into their version of jihad, and they didn’t really give a shit about him. 
So it was more like: ‘Here, go make your jihad in Jordan. That sounds great.’” 
- Nada Bakos, former analyst for the CIA 
Early Iterations of al-Qaeda in Iraq 
 It was in late 1993 that the first iteration of al-Qaeda in Iraq formed. As earlier recorded, 
this organization was called Bayit al-Imam (Allegiance to the Imam). It was, in fact, created by 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Maqdisi and Zarqawi formed Bayit 
al-Imam due to a variety of causes. First, both men had just returned from Hayatabad, Pakistan, 
where they had been waging jihad against the Soviets. The men did not want to give up their 
cause.323 By this point, Zarqawi had already had an epiphany, a dream in which “a sword had fallen 
from the sky and upon which the word ‘jihad’ was prescribed.”324 According to Zarqawi, his fate 
was set; his new lifelong mission was to wage jihad. 
Secondly, the men had major religious and political concerns. Western culture saturated 
within the Jordanian borders; “alcohol, pornography, and sex could be had relatively easily.”325 
Coupled with major geopolitical events—the Palestinians signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, the 
Iraqis losing the Gulf War to the Americans, and peace talks beginning between the Jordanians 
and Israelis—Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were enraged. With some seed money from bin Laden to 
help get the jihadist organization running, Zarqawi and Maqdisi were able to begin stockpiling 
weaponry.326  
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Despite their passion for operating against the Jordanian government, Zarqawi and Maqdisi 
were being tracked by the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (mukhabarat). When the two 
men tried to flee the mukhabarat in March 1994, they were arrested, charged, and convicted with 
possessing illegal weapons and belonging to a terrorist operation. Apparently, both men tried to 
turn their trial into propaganda. They decried everybody in the courtroom for their haram 
(religiously forbidden) behavior and even submitted a letter to the judge “in which they claimed 
that [the courtroom] was acting against the teachings of the Holy Quran.”327 While at the time, the 
co-conspirators’ actions seemed insignificant, they would catch the attention of bin Laden.328 
As earlier recorded, Zarqawi’s time in prison was extremely transformative. Zarqawi used 
the time to study the Qur’an and became hardened in his faith. Yet Zarqawi’s prison sentence did 
not only impact Zarqawi, but also, Bayit al-Imam itself. Zarqawi spent the time converting many 
to his cause. From petty criminals to Afghan Arabs like himself, Zarqawi gained many new 
followers in prison. 
Zarqawi even was able to use the time in prison to recruit outside of the prison walls. He 
had quite an operation going. Zarqawi was the recruiter who controlled the entire apparatus. 
Maqdisi was the preacher, whose Islamist sermons would reverberate throughout the prison walls. 
And, with the help of Maqdisi’s closest friend, Sheikh Abu Qatada, Maqdisi’s speeches went 
beyond the prison. The operation is well described by journalist Mary Anne Weaver, who writes: 
“Now al-Maqdisi’s religious tracts were smuggled out of Sawaqa by prisoners’ wives and mothers, 
with help from sympathetic prison guards, and they were sent on to Abu Qatada, who posted them 
on the Web sites of Salafists and jihadists throughout Europe, the Middle East, and the Persian 
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Gulf.”329 Clearly, Zarqawi’s media efforts had not ended, despite his incarceration. By the time of 
Zarqawi’s release in 1999, he had become the amir (prince) of Bayit al-Imam.  
After being released from prison, it is possible that Zarqawi may have even planned a major 
terrorist attack. Nicknamed the “Millennium Plot,” the attack was planned to bomb Christian 
tourist sites in Jordan during the 2000 millennium celebrations.330 Yet, the plot was foiled by 
Jordanian authorities, and Zarqawi escaped to Pakistan. 
In 2000, Zarqawi began working on a new project—the creation of the group, Jamaat al-
Taawhid wa-l-lihad (JTWJ, School of Unity and Jihad), in the Afghanistan city of Herat.331 Bin 
Laden gave JTWJ somewhere between $5,000 to $200,000 in seed money.332 According to 
terrorism specialists Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, “This may have been a test to see how 
well al-Zarqawi could get on with so little.”333 The camp was scarce, just a small patch of land 
with a banner reading Tawhid wal-Jihad, “a couple of chin-up bars, and guys running around with 
AK-47s,” as reported by an ex-Pentagon official.334 Though located in Afghanistan, the camp 
fielded many recruits from Jordan and Palestine. To the chagrin of bin Laden, Zarqawi intended 
his camp to train recruits in jihad against Middle Eastern apostate regime, not against the “far 
enemy.”335 
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With the “near enemy” strategy in mind, in 2002, Zarqawi went about planning another 
attack. JTWJ received $35,000 from al-Qaeda to conduct a suicide operation on Israel.336 Yet the 
two Jordanians Zarqawi sent to fulfill the mission—two men Zarqawi had met in prison—were 
arrested in Turkey.337 Once again, Zarqawi’s attempt at a terrorist attack had failed.  
Zarqawi quickly had to flee his Herat base, and with him, he brought the JTWJ to Iraq. 
Once in Iraq, Zarqawi set about recreating his network. As earlier suggested, Zarqawi used the 
notoriety from Powell’s infamous 2002 U.N. speech to help unify the diverse jihadi groups in Iraq. 
These groups included Ansar al-Islam, Jaysh Mohammed, al-Jamaa Salafiya, Takfir wal Hijra, 
and Jund al-Sham. The names of the groups give a window into their ideological basis. For 
instance, takfir wal hijra clearly takes pride in a takfiri, anti-Shia mindset. 
The reason for the diversity of jihadist groups in Iraq partially reverts to the First Gulf War. 
Saddam Hussein “sought to fortify his regime against fundamentalist opponents, foreign and 
domestic, such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus he Islamized his regime.”338 In other words, 
Hussein was attempting to shore up concerns of internal opposition by fortifying his own religious 
credentials. Hussein’s Islamization of Iraqi politics would come to be known as the Faith 
Campaign and would have major implications for the next two decades. 
One of the most notable trends emerging from the Faith Campaign was the rise in 
militarized Islam. Hussein sent many of his top military officers to Salafist Islamic Schools, 
thinking that they could infiltrate the movements while remaining loyal to the Baathist regime.339 
The opposite occurred: many officers emerged more loyal to Salafism than Saddam’s Baathist 
regime. Thus, Hussein had created many Salafists that would go on to attack his relatively 
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“secular” regime. Intelligence officials now had a keen appreciation for the depths of Sunni 
religiosity in Iraq and learned how to exploit it.340 When the Americans would later invade, many 
of these intelligence officers would utilize such knowledge to the benefit of AQI. For the time 
being, however, the Faith Campaign would simply lead to an overall amplification of conservative 
Salafism through the Iraqi Sunni community. 
Thus, even before the U.S. forces invaded Iraq, there were many Iraqi, Syrian, and 
Jordanian Sunnis who could be convinced to join Zarqawi. In Iraq, recruitment was partially driven 
by the amount of animosity against the international community. Since the First Gulf War in 1991, 
U.S. support for the Iraqi people against the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein had not materialized. 
International relations scholar, Fawaz Gerges, describes the brutal conditions that emerged in Iraq 
by 2003: 
...the UN sanctions regime, led by the United States and seconded by Great Britain, also further contributed 
to the collapse of the country’s water, electricity, health care, and agriculture systems and hyperinflation set 
in. As the country’s economy continued its downward spiral, two-thirds of the Iraqi army were demobilized, 
with many facing unemployment upon their return home. Government salaries were heavily cut if even paid. 
With teachers leaving their jobs and chronic shortages in school supplies, the education system was also 
heavily affected, leading to a sharp fall in the country’s literacy rates. Between Hussein’s catastrophic wars 
and policies, the bombing campaign, and the UN embargo, Iraq’s socioeconomic fabric had been torn by the 
time of the 2003 invasion…341 
 
Understandably, the U.S.-led sanctions caused many Iraqis to blame the U.S. for their country’s decline. 
Coupled with the rise of Salafism, a Wahhabi, anti-Western doctrine began to arise within Iraq’s Sunni 
community. 
To add fuel to the fire, in the months leading up to the U.S. occupation, Osama bin Laden began a 
massive media campaign against Western forces. Bin Laden advocated for “martyrdom occupations,” or 
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suicide bombings, in order to fight the coming American forces.342 Osama bin Laden would soon get his 
call answered. 
On October 28, 2002, Zarqawi got a chance to test his new Sunni coalition. Zarqawi’s associates 
Salem Saad Salem Ben Suweid (aka Abu Abdallah) and Mohammed Issa Mohammed Daamas (aka Abu 
Oman), successfully snuck into Jordan. The two men then assassinated Laurence Foley, an American 
USAID worker, in Foley’s own garage.343 The attack was the first of many successful attacks planned by 
Zarqawi and represented a turning point in his career. 
 In March 2003, the U.S. occupation of Iraq dramatically shifted the relationship between JTWJ and 
AQC. The invasion gave al-Qaeda an opportune chance to strike U.S. forces, though AQC still needed 
regional support.344 At the time, al-Zarqawi wanted JTWJ to remain independent, but his organization was 
still struggling to make a significant impact in Iraq. Ansar al-Islam, one of JTWJ’s affiliates, issued a press 
release that June calling for recruits to fight against the Americans. In order to recuperate from the 
bombings that the group was facing, Ansar al-Islam leadership also appealed for donations.345 It appeared 
Zarqawi’s organization was under some financial stress. 
 To combat the challenges the JTWJ was facing, Zarqawi employed a double strategy of ultra-
violence and media propaganda of such violence. In August, Zarqawi made his Iraqi debut through a string 
of attacks. The first attack occurred on August 7th when Zarqawi’s men exploded a van against a wall 
outside the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad.346 The blast killed seventeen people. Twelve days later, another 
JTWJ member exploded a bomb-laden truck outside Baghdad’s Canal Hotel, the headquarters of the UN 
in Baghdad.347 Twenty-two humanitarian aid workers were killed, including Special Representative of the 
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Secretary-General, Sergio Vieria de Mello.348 200 others were injured. Then, on August 29th, Zarqawi’s 
forces attacked the Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib Mosque in Najaf.349 The attacks killed ninety-five Shia, 
including the founder of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). 
Notably, the embassy attack was on a “far enemy” target, perhaps to appease bin Laden while he 
and Zarqawi negotiated the status of JTWJ. However, it is equally possible that the attack was to generate 
greater media exposure, particularly to Western audiences, as the next chapter will argue. With Zarqawi’s 
attempt to grow the reputation of his own organization, notoriety was certainly necessary. 
 Remarkably, these attacks were coordinated with significant help from former Baathists. Retired 
U.S. Army Colonel, Derek Harvey, explains: “Originally, the Baathists cooperated in the bombing of the 
U.N. and in other suicide bombings in 2003. The safe houses of the suicide bombers were adjacent to 
compounds and residences of the Special Security Organization [SSO] officers.”350 Harvey further details 
that the SSO, a security apparatus in charge of the Special Republican Guard and Special Forces, gave 
JTWJ the trucks to complete their operations.351 Finally, Harvey reports that that same Summer, SSO forces 
were even facilitating corridors for foreign fighters to enter Iraq. The Faith Campaign, yet again, was 
propelling Iraqi forces against the Americans. 
 Anti-American sentiment was also bolstered by Zarqawi’s robust media strategy which prominently 
displayed dead U.S. soldiers. Even as early as March 2003, Ansar al-Islam posted images and videos on 
its website of mutilated bodies of American soldiers.352 Yet, the most famous video Zarqawi helped to 
create was the execution of a twenty-six-year-old American contractor, Nicholas Berg, who was beheaded 
on April 9, 2004.353 Rather than staying quiet about the grotesque execution, Zarqawi seemed to revel in 
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the gruesome content. Muntada al-Ansar, a JTWJ affiliate, posted a video of the execution on its website.354 
Al-Zarqawi, the thought-to-be executioner in the video, was quite intentional with his staging. He fully 
demonstrated the beheading and gore of the video on-screen.355 From this detail, it becomes clear that the 
video was made as propaganda intended to terrify JTWJ’s targets and expand the notoriety of the JTWJ. 
Indeed, the strategy of brutal beheadings would later become ISIS’ de-facto propaganda tool. 
“Within a half year after the invasion of Iraq... Zarqawi became a household name for his brutal personal 
beheadings and fast-paced suicide bombing campaign against Shiite religious targets and Sunni civilians, 
among others,” writes terrorism scholar Aaron Zelin.356 It was through these beheadings and suicide 
bombings that Zarqawi received the nickname: Sheikh of the Slaughterers. 
 The video of Berg’s beheading quickly made international news. With it, Zarqawi’s name was 
elevated, and he became a “pioneer” of combining horrific ultra-violence with mass media.357 Not to 
mention, “the media coverage only made him more popular among militant Islamist circles in both the 
Arab world in the West, and, in turn, it facilitated the recruitment of jihadists abroad.”358 Between 
committing discriminate violence and distributing propaganda of such discriminate violence, Zarqawi had 
finally created a lasting media strategy. 
Zarqawi Pledges Baya...Finally 
 After years of negotiations, Zarqawi eventually pledged baya to bin Laden in 2004, an act that 
officially linked JTWJ to al-Qaeda.359 With al-Zarqawi’s pledge, he now gained access to the donors, 
logistics, and recruitment facilitation networks of AQC.360 Al-Zarqawi also renamed the group Tanzim 
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Qaedat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers), though it was known more 
commonly as AQI.361 
 The timing of Zarqawi’s baya may seem odd, given that, at this point, Zarqawi and bin Laden had 
extremely divergent views on the direction they wanted to take al-Qaeda. Bin Laden’s focus was still 
concentrated on targeting the “far enemy.” Al-Zarqawi was much more interested in fighting “near 
enemies.”362 Even more concerning to bin Laden, was al-Zarqawi’s substantial violence against local 
Muslims: Though AQC by no means advocated a peaceful strategy, bin Laden was very concerned with 
growing the support of local partners. If locals saw AQI blowing up Shia mosques or, even worse, liberal, 
Sunni mosques, bin Laden was worried the Iraqis would see it as “Muslims killing other Muslims.”363 
Finally, Zarqawi’s desperation to grow the power of AQI was quite potent. From its outset, al-Zawahiri 
hoped AQI would provide the means to build and declare an Islamic State.364 Though this was one of 
AQC’s long-term goals, bin Laden was adamant that it was not yet the time to declare a caliphate. 
Despite bin Laden and Zarqawi’s divergent positions, Zarqawi was forced to pledge baya when the 
Americans launched an offensive in Fallujah that October. Zarqawi published the baya on JTWJ’s Website 
in order to reinforce support from his parent organization.365 
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The U.S. success in Fallujah would cause Zarqawi to flee, but at Fallujah, Zarqawi had won another 
media battle. For one, seventy marines were killed and 651 more were wounded in the battle.366 Compared 
to 2,175 insurgents who died, these numbers may seem low. However, Zarqawi was able to portray the 
dead insurgents as martyrs and the Americans as aggressors.367 In the media battlefield, that went a long 
way. In addition to the many casualties, the Battle of Fallujah resulted in significant destruction of the city. 
“The aftermath was a pocked moonscape, uninhabitable for many—not that many were left,” wrote 
Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan. The massive destruction proved that America was waging “a total war 
against Islam,” in the words bin Laden himself.368 At this point, AQI was winning the media battle against 
the Americans. 
In December 2004, bin Laden publicly responded to Zarqawi’s baya, solidifying the already 
extensive relationship between al-Qaeda Central and JTWJ. The audiotape was broadcast on al Jazeera, 
further popularizing the message.369 Nonetheless, in private, bin Laden reprimanded the new organization. 
In an intercepted letter from Zawahiri (then, the deputy head of al-Qaeda) to Zarqawi, Zawahiri and bin 
Laden’s frustration with Zarqawi becomes quite clear.370 Zawahiri’s message “urged Zarqawi to remember 
“that we are in a battle” and that “more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the 
media.”371 Zawahiri even “warns Zarqawi that his beheading and slaughtering of hostages is bad 
propaganda.”372 Al-Qaeda was growing quite concerned over Zarqawi’s impact on the al-Qaeda media 
strategy. 
 
366 Weiss and Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army, 38. 
367 Ibid, 38. Zarqawi publicly called the martyrs “courageous resisters of Fallouja.” [Brisard, Zarqawi: The New 
Face, 151]. 
368 Weiss and Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army, 38. 
369 Gerges, ISIS: A History, 74. 
370 Lee Hudson Teslik, “Profile: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign 
Relations, June 8, 2006), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/profile-abu-musab-al-zarqawi. 
371 Zelin, “The War between ISIS” (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2014), 3. 
372 Gerges, ISIS: A History, 80. 
90 
 
Yet, Zarqawi, seemingly immune to criticism from his parent organization, continued his sectarian 
campaign. For instance, on November 5, 2005, AQI suicide bombers attacked three US-owned hotels in 
Amman, Jordan.373 The attack would be the worst terror attack in Jordanian history, killing sixty people.374 
Then, on February 22, 2006, four AQI terrorists detonated explosives inside the al-Askari Mosque in 
Samarra, Iraq.375 The mosque is one of the holiest shrines in Shia Islam. 
As the former chapter suggested, the attacks had mixed effects. On one hand, the sectarian violence 
heightened tensions between Shi’a and Sunni Iraqis. On the other hand, many Sunni Muslims rejected the 
violence committed by Zarqawi. Zarqawi’s bombings in Jordan would cause most Jordanians to consider 
AQI a terrorist organization.376 In Iraq, an organization even began called the Majlis al-Sahwa (Awakening 
Councils) which demonstrated a public desire to expel AQI from the Sunni triangle. Zarqawi’s death in 
2006 would ultimately be a sigh of relief for much of the Muslim world. However, what would come to 
follow would be even worse. 
The Rise of ISI 
 After Zarqawi was killed, an umbrella Islamist organization, Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (the 
Mujahideen Shura Council) met to decide the fate of jihad in Iraq. They made two major decisions. First, 
the group decided to merge all their groups into AQI and to rebrand the organization the Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI).377 Secondly, they chose Abu Omar al-Baghdadi as Zarqawi’s replacement. Zarqawi’s deputy, 
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (aka Abu Ayyub al-Masri), pledged baya to al-Baghdadi. Al--Muhajir’s baya 
effectively transferred the extensive resources of MSM to al-Baghdadi. While al-Baghdadi’s state, the 
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), was still an AQI affiliate, none of these changes in leadership or a declaration 
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of an Islamic State were approved by AQC.378 Neither Zawahiri nor bin Laden were consulted on the quite 
significant decisions that Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin made on behalf of AQI. 
Nevertheless, bin Laden stayed firm on his decision to present a front of unity. Bin Laden even 
ordered his lieutenants to defend ISI’s declaration and “even provided the language for al-Zawahiri to use 
to justify its ally’s decisions.”379 Such a move demonstrated the relative weakness of al-Qaeda at the time. 
Like a parent trying to control a combative, young adult, al-Qaeda was fighting a losing battle. 
 After the death of Zarqawi, it initially appeared that ISI was on the decline. As earlier suggested, 
Zarqawi’s strategy of extreme violence and sectarianism was not particularly popular with Sunni Iraqis in 
2006. Moreover, by 2007, the Majlis al-Sahwa had spread throughout all of Iraq and even received 
American backing.380 The same year, thirty-thousand more U.S. troops entered Iraq, in a military feat now 
known as “The Surge.”381 It also hurt that by 2010, U.S. forces had captured or killed thirty four of the two 
forty two AQI leaders.382 Together, these trends significantly crippled both ISI’s popularity with Iraqi 
Sunnis and its ability to enact terror on its targets. 
 Ultimately, however, ISI’s popularity re-emerged. In part, this was due to a reduced U.S. presence 
in Iraq. In November 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-
Maliki signed the “Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship 
Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America.”383 Despite what the declaration’s long-
winded title would suggest, the agreement’s main impact was the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, not 
a robust, long-term plan for how the Iraqi government would function after the withdrawal. 
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The plan had major implications for the Sahwa movement. When the U.S. began to pull out of Iraq, 
the Maliki government began to go after the Sahwa adherents. Such a trend was detailed by terrorism 
specialist, Fawaz A. Gerges: 
As long as US troops were in Iraq, the Sahwa were protected and their actions were heralded as a triumph, 
even though their tactics were not always lawful. After the transfer of authority to the Iraqi government, 
many of their members were incriminated and placed under investigation, thus deepening the divide between 
local and national politics...By 2009, tribal leaders were targeted by both ISI and the Iraqi forces.384 
 
Dr. Jaber al-Jaberi, senior political advisor to the former deputy prime minister, also described this trend: 
“People don’t believe in the term ‘Awakening’ anymore because when the Iraqi government finished 
using the tribes, it turned against the Sons of Iraq.”385 What had once been a popular movement throughout 
the Sunni community became a sentence for imprisonment, or worse. 
ISI’s media team was quick to take advantage of the newfound rivalry between the tribes and the 
Iraqi government. Much of ISI’s propaganda from this time used the term sahwat (practitioner of sahwa) 
in the pejorative and boasted of the destruction it enacted on the sahwat.386 With little trust in the 
government, the Sunni tribes of Iraq found themselves without allies and in danger. Sahwa became a 
dangerous affiliation and, thus, some of ISI’s biggest Iraqi resistors melted away. 
 The turn of the new Iraqi government on the Sahwa movement represented just one example of 
many of the sectarian policies that the Prime Minister Maliki, a Shi’a, would come to be known for. In the 
eyes of many Iraqi Sunnis, Maliki would treat Sunni Arabs like second-class citizens.387 For instance, 
since the formation of the post-Hussein government in Iraq, the new Shi’a government began a policy 
called de-Baathification. The policy is thought to have driven at least 50,000 Iraqis, mostly Sunni, from 
government jobs—though some estimates put the number as high as 100,000.388 Many of the jobs lost 
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were in the Iraqi army. Thus, Sunni commanders were released from their duty in the favor of Shi’a 
commanders. The policies not only led to less competence when Iraq would come to battle ISIS; de-
Baathification would mean that many highly trained militaristic Sunnis would be in search of employment. 
As a result, many former members of the Baathist army now joined ISIS. The trend was so profound that 
one expert estimates more than twenty-five of ISIS’ top forty leaders were once part of the Iraqi military.389 
Though, given its roots in post-2003 policy, de-Baathification does not explain exactly why the Iraqi Sunni 
community ultimately shifted its support back to ISIS, coupled with anti-Sahwa policies, de-Baathification 
would have a profound impact on Sunni disenfranchisement.  
 Four other major trends do explain the timing of the rise of Sunni radicalization: mass-
imprisonment, a contentious 2010 election, the Arab Spring, and the formation of a robust social media 
apparatus for AQI. 
First, the success of the Sahwa movement meant that, by the time U.S. troops began to withdraw, 
tens of thousands of Iraqis were in prison. By 2007, it was estimated that Camp Bucca, the prison that had 
formerly held Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, held 26,000 detainees.390 In 2007, an odd trend began to emerge. It 
seemed that some Iraqis wanted to be detained. Major General Doug Stone, who oversaw Camp Bucca, 
described, “If you were looking to build an army, prison is the perfect place to do it. We gave them health 
care, dental, fed them, and, most importantly, we kept them from getting killed in combat. Who needs a 
safe house in Anbar when there’s an American jail in Basra?”391 Such a sentiment was echoed by a former 
ISIS member interviewed by the Guardian: “We could never have all got together like this in Baghdad, or 
anywhere else….Here, we were not only safe, but we were only a few hundred [meters] away from the 
entire al-Qaida leadership.”392 If a Sunni Iraqi wanted to join the resistance against the Americans or the 
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Iraqi government, he would not need to personally know someone in the organization. Instead, he could 
simply find a way to be arrested, which, in the anti-Sunni environment that was increasingly clear through 
Maliki’s governance, it was not that difficult to do. The trend of joining ISI after being imprisoned was so 
common that Major Stone referred to the US-run prisons as “jihadi universities.”393 Many Iraqi prisoners 
that did not intend to join ISI were radicalized, simply by the nature of being surrounded by many powerful 
extremists. By recuperating in prisons, ISI was playing the long game. As of late 2007, it would just be a 
matter of time before the Americans would leave. 
 The second major timely event that impacted Sunni radicalization during this time period was the 
2010 parliamentary elections. What is most important to note about these elections, was how negatively 
Sunni Iraqis viewed the 2010 elections. It was the first national election, in which “al-Maliki did not win 
as easily as he had expected to, and technically did not win at all.”394 Through apt political maneuvering, 
al-Maliki, despite not gaining the majority of vote, was able to hold power and stay in his seat as Prime 
Minister.395 The plot exacerbated Sunni frustration with the central Iraqi government. As noted by former 
U.S. diplomat, Ali Khedery, many Sunnis were convinced they were purposefully being kept from power 
and the government did “little to dispel this assumption.”396  
 Yet another major blow to the central government’s authority came in the form of the Arab Spring. 
While initially the protests were peaceful and simply called for reforms, in Sunni areas the growing rage 
turned these protests into demands for Maliki to resign.397 While Maliki’s government denied media 
coverage of key protests, such as the Day of Rage protest on February 25, 2011, protesters took to social 
media to spread the revolution.398 The Arab Spring protest in Iraq would have a mixed impact on the 
 
393 Ibid, 82. 
394 Ibid, 89.  
395 For a full account of the election, see Weiss and Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army, 90-93. 
396 Ibid, 92. 
397 Gerges, ISIS: A History, 120. 




emerging ISI movement. On one hand, many of the protests emphasized unity, thereby indirectly 
critiquing the sectarian messaging of ISI.399 Nonetheless, the protests brought a significant amount of 
activism online. The lack of regulation on the World Wide Web would prove crucial for ISI in the coming 
years and prove an inroad to radicalizing the Iraqi community. Moreover, the Maliki regime substantially 
repressed the protests, further enraging Iraqis. Sunnis, who already had reason enough to be frustrated, 
were only pushed into the hands of non-government militias such as ISI.  
Though the socio-political conditions of Iraq are a bit beyond the scope of this paper, they are 
important to grasp in order to understand the ideal timing of ISI’s campaign in Iraq. Without these 
underlying factors, ISI would likely not have been able to take such strong hold over the territory it would 
come to capture. Nor would ISI have had such a substantial following online. 
The fourth and final factor that led to the radicalization of Sunni Iraqis was the formation 
of a robust media apparatus for AQI. On October 31, 2006, the formation of Mu’assat al-Furqan 
li al-Llami (al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production) was announced.400 By December, the 
organization began a popular bout of media publications. The first was the “Knights of 
Martyrdom,” a series documenting suicide operations throughout Iraq.401 A second popular series 
was news reports from the “Ministry of Information of the Islamic State of Iraq” which were issued 
on nearly a daily basis and were translated in both Arabic and English. While al-Furqan was the 
most popular media branch of ISI, there were also many unofficial media production centers: 
Katibat al-Jihad al-Ilami (The Media Jihad Brigade), al-Markaz al-Iraqi al-Islami li l’Ilam (The 
Iraqi Islamic Media Center), Haqq (Truth Agency), Qaidat al-Jihad, and al-Buraq Media 
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Establishment.402 Throughout their introduction in 2006, most of these media agencies posted 
content in both Arabic and English as well as short and long videos documenting jihadi activity in 
Iraq. Despite a series of coalition raids in the summer of 2007 that “took its toll on the central 
media office,”403 the diversity media operations allowed for ISI to continue producing content. 
Through ISI’s prolific media efforts during this time period, it becomes clear that media operations 
were central to ISI’s state-building strategy. 
The four overlooked factors would come to haunt the U.S. as it withdrew in 2011. In fact, 
many in the U.S. and Iraqi military believed it was important to extend the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA) in order to allow U.S. combat troops to remain in the country longer.404 Yet, 
partially due to President Obama’s reluctance to bring the issue to a deeply divided parliament, 
SOFA remained as was. U.S. troops withdrew by December 31, 2011, leaving behind a country 
wracked in conflict. ISI was ready to strike both militarily and through its media. 
Division in Syria 
 It was not simply ISI’s political activism in Iraq that mobilized recruitment for the group, 
ISI, through its affiliate, Jubhat al-Nusra, was extremely effective in taking territory in Syria. This 
was, in part, due to the similar sectarian environment fostered by Bashar al-Assad’s government. 
Notably, ISI did not try to extend its operations into Syria until 2011, the year the civil war in Syria 
began. Jabhat al-Nusra was founded by Abu Mohammed al-Jolani in 2011 with the intention to 
fight the Assad regime. This thereby suggests that ISI was neither operationally capable nor felt 
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that it would be popular enough with local Syrian populations to begin operations until the highly 
sectarian environment of 2011.  
However, it is important that JN was only popularized by taking a slightly different strategy 
than ISI. If JN represented an initial test of ISI’s popularity in Syria, ISI would fail the test. 
Ultimately, the strife from the two organizations would sow the seeds for ISI to split from its parent 
organization. In part, the divorce was due to an image campaign that al-Nusra had been attempting 
to wage among the Syrian Sunni community. John Turner describes: 
Al-Nusra's image campaign was evident during the battle of Aleppo, where they attempted to ensure 
bakeries remained open and supplied, subsidized the cost of bread, and largely refrained from 
imposing themselves on the locals through mandating a conservative form of sharia. This is in stark 
contrast to attempts by ISIS [then, known as ISI] to deprive government-held areas of supplies, which 
also increased food shortages in Aleppo.405 
 
ISI positioned itself as strongly against central government bodies, particularly against the Iraqi 
central government. In sharp contrast, al-Nusra was far more interested in generating a positive 
image; while JN represented an alternative to the Assad regime, Jolani was far more concerned 
with gaining the support of the local community through acts of service. 
JN’s desire to integrate with the Sunni community is a subtle but important difference 
between ISI and JN. In fact, initially, al-Nusra took on a strategy similar to ISI—at least, until the 
strategy proved unpopular in Syria. On January 23, 2012, JN released a video to al-Qaeda forums 
entitled, “For the people of Syria from the Mujahideen of Syria in the Fields of jihad.”406 The video 
declared war on Assad but simultaneously stressed Jabhat al-Nusra’s domestic Syrian focus. Yet, 
given that the group had already introduced itself with a bloody bombing of policeman buses, an 
operation that killed twenty-six Syrians, the video was not received well. In a historical survey of 
the group, scholar Charles Lister conveys, “Urban suicide bombings and videos tinged with jihadi 
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nasheeds [jihadist anthems] released onto al-Qaida internet forums brought with them the fear that 
the notoriously brutal ISI had come to town.”407 JN’s initial propaganda was out of line with the 
horrific attacks it was waging on Syrian soil.  
In late 2012, JN changed strategies. In addition to subsidizing the cost of bread for many 
Aleppo residents, it also helped to deliver heating gas, water, cleaning and health care services, 
and other forms of civil assistance.408 The group also stressed its alliance with al-Qaeda over its 
affiliation with ISI. Al-Jolani even refused direct orders from al-Baghdadi to announce JN as part 
of ISI.409 The dual strategy by JN paid off: when the U.S. designated JN a terrorist organization in 
December 2012, a week of demonstrations began that promoted the slogan “We are all Jabhat al-
Nusra.”410 Just as ISI had begun to eclipse its own parent organization, Jubhat al-Nusra was 
eclipsing ISI in Syria. 
The Great Divorce 
By the mid-2013, long-standing tensions between both ISI and Jubhat al-Nusra and ISI and 
al-Qaeda Central began to reach their peak. AQC leadership began to publicly voice concerns 
about how ISIS’ violence could hurt its international reputation. The American al-Qaeda 
spokesman, Adam Ghadan, even argued that AQC had to split with ISIS lest it “risk the ruin of its 
reputation.”411 
When al-Baghdadi released an audio message in April announcing that ISI was subsuming 
JN, al-Jolani immediately sought the ruling of al-Qaeda Central. While it is commonly known that 
al-Jolani sought the support of AQC in response to al-Baghdadi’s expansion, it is additionally 
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important to note that al-Baghdadi also reached out to AQC for guidance when al-Jolani did not 
comply.412 As terrorism scholars Tricia Bacon and Elizabeth Arsenault describe, “This move belies 
the notion that the alliance between Al Qaeda and ISIS was already irrelevant, despite the 
ambiguity about al-Baghdadi’s Oath.”413 This hereby suggests that al-Baghdadi did, indeed, rely 
on the leadership of al-Qaeda Central. 
As earlier recorded, al-Zawahiri’s ultimate ruling that JN was separate from ISIS and that 
ISIS should return to the Iraq front significantly upset Baghdadi and led to ideological struggles 
between the JN and ISIS leadership throughout 2014. After al-Zawahiri formally denounced ISIS’ 
actions, claims reverberated throughout ISIS and al-Qaeda ranks that their opponent had lost its 
divine mandate. Throughout the remainder of 2014, some of al-Qaeda’s regional partners broke 
with AQC and pledged loyalty to ISIS, including some core al-Qaeda groups in the Arabian 
Peninsula and the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.414 Several former high-ranking al-Qaeda sheikhs 
also denounced al-Qaeda: 
Together, with eight other al-Qaeda sheikhs, Salah al-Din accused al-Qaeda itself of numerous 
illegitimate acts: softness in dealing with the Shi’a, daring to declare that former Egyptian President 
Morsi was a Muslim, “excessive complimenting of what was called the Arab Spring,” supporting 
political work rather than fighting, and repudiating ISIS.415 
 
Nonetheless, most leaders remained faithful to AQC; only one establishment leader moved to 
support ISIS.  
On the ground, violence broke out. By the end of 2013, ISIS commanders extended their 
indiscriminate violence to JN. Most of JN’s non-Syrian members began to defect to ISIS and took 
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up arms against their former comrades, creating a “war within a war.”416 Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
JN’s approach was to “comparatively more pragmatic and cooperative...deepening its relationships 
with supportive jihadi factions and Syrian Salafis.”417 Some of the fighting ISIS perpetrated against 
JN was particularly brutal, leading to 1,400 fighters being killed in a sarin gas attack in northeastern 
Damascus.418 Infighting between JN and ISIS is thought to have led to about four thousand deaths 
between the two groups.419 
Though fighting between AQC and ISIS never officially occurred, al-Zawahiri considered 
the ISIS attacks on JN to be direct attacks on al-Qaeda.420 Publicly, al-Zawahiri called for the end 
of fitna (infighting), but for ISIS, the calls would fall on deaf ears. By early-February 2014, al-
Zawahiri officially renounced any organizational links to ISIS and its leadership.421 Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq was officially dissolved.  
Of important note during the split was the increasing role that media publications had on 
increasing the tension between al-Qaeda and ISIS. Zawahiri’s complaint with ISIS was not simply 
that ISIS was attacking fellow jihadists, but that those attacks were being publicized throughout 
their media operations. Moreover, ISIS specifically used its media operations to distinguish itself 
from al-Nusra and al-Qaeda, demonstrating the birth of ISIS’ own independent media strategy. By 
this point, media had centralized itself as a key component of each of the groups’ strategy. 
Reputation was almost tantamount to physical presence. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the 
role of media would only increase as ISIS firmly established itself in both Iraq and Syria. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CALIPHATE.COM 
“We keep hearing that the antidote is preaching moderate Islam. I tell people on the National 
Security Council, ‘Don’t you have kids? Does anything moderate appeal to them?’” 
- Scott Atran, Former CIA analyst 
Baqiyya wa Tatamaddad (Remaining and Expanding) 
 2014 was a major year for ISIS. Despite tension with their former partners in crime, Jabhat-
al-Nusra and al-Qaeda Central, throughout 2012 and 2013, ISIS had amassed significant territory 
in both Iraq and Syria. ISIS’ first major campaign began in July 2012. Called “Breaking down the 
Walls,” it had three main goals: (1) secure the release of prisoners; (2) recapture territory that had 
been lost through the U.S. offensive; and (3) target the Shi’a.422 The campaign was a major success 
in many ways. 500 inmates were freed from Abu Ghraib prison and, during the last three months 
of 2012, there were thirty suicide bombings per month on mostly Shi’a targets.423 Not to mention, 
by December 30th, 2013, ISIS took control of Fallujah, a city just 43 miles from Baghdad.424 A 
month later, ISIS took over Raqqa, declaring it the capital of the ISIS emirate.425 ISIS’ most famous 
success came in the Summer of 2014 when, after capturing Mosul, Tikrit, and significant territory 
in North-East Iraq, on June 29th, ISIS officially declared a caliphate. 
 ISIS’s territorial expansion coincided with a simultaneous rise in ISIS fighters. The U.S. 
Department of State estimates that in 2005 and 2006, there were about 1,000 ISIS fighters.426 
Figures from 2011 place the number of fighters somewhere around 1,000 to 2,000 men.427 These 
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numbers shot up dramatically in 2013; a 2014 CIA report suggests that there were about 20,000 to 
31,500 ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria.428 Not all these fighters were from the territory that ISIS 
had captured either. A 2015 report by the National Counterterrorism Center counts around 20,000 
foreign fighters from ninety different countries to be in ISIS’ ranks at this time.429 While, given 
that radicalization occurs for a variety of reasons, it is impossible to know exactly what mobilized 
such a massive number of fighters, there are two explanations of note. 
 One possibility that explains such a massive upsurge in recruitment around 2014 is that the 
creation of a caliphate was attractive to disenfranchised Muslims. Supporting this argument 
structure is the mere timing of an uptick of recruitment after the creation of the caliphate. Indeed, 
one anthropologist, Scott Atran, interviewed Muslims affiliated with ISIS in order to understand 
their support of the organization. He reports that one Spanish imam said, “We always rejected 
violence, but Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi put us [Muslims] on the map. The caliphate doesn’t have to 
be violent. It can be just like the European Union!”430 Extrapolating from such an interview, it is 
highly possible that others felt similarly. Certainly, the Sykes-Picot breakup of the Arab states had 
been a headache for many Arabs, to say the least. The caliphate represented an Islamic State of 
their own—or, at least, a state for Salafi-affiliated Sunni Muslims. 
 While the caliphate argument holds some credence, there is a much more likely explanation 
for the rise in ISIS fighters. The diversity of fighters thereby suggests that there was more at play 
than territorial domination, something unique was attracting foreign fighters and native Syrians 
and Iraqis to join ISIS’ ranks. That something special came in the form of media. As demonstrated 
by Figure 3, after the Islamic State’s Caliphate was declared, a surge of accounts affiliated to ISIS 
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appeared on social media sites. This hereby suggested that, additionally to building a robust 
physical following, ISIS was building a strong online community. 
 
Figure 3431: Month of Account Creation of Twitter 
 
 
An Online Caliphate 
 When ISIS declared itself a Caliphate in 2014, it quickly became clear that this caliphate 
did not simply have physical properties; ISIS specifically leveraged the online landscape to expand 
its control. At first, it appeared that ISIS was relying significantly on al-Qaeda’s own strategy. As 
shown by Figure 4, a 2018 comparative study found that YouTube videos were the primary source 
of video distribution by both ISIS and al-Qaeda. Moreover, at least before the creation of the 
caliphate, many of the videos that ISIS initially produced had similar content to al-Qaeda’s 
productions.432 For instance, the first key media published by ISI in 2012 was “The Expedition of 
the Prisoners #1,” a thirty-six-minute video released by al-Furqan. It used clips from Western and 
Arab media sources, critiqued the U.S. occupation of Iraq (the far enemy), and contained an overall 
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political message.433 This type of video was popular for al-Qaeda Central as well; the only aspect 
of the video that distinguishes it as an ISI video is a short audio clip of al-Zarqawi “denouncing 
the Shiites” and two audio clips of al-Muhajir “who says of the Iraqi Shiites, ‘kill them, crucify 
them, and cut off their limbs.’”434 This content is troubling, but in the context of a thirty-six minute 
video, these comments are not centralized as the focus of the video. Not to mention, as is typical 
of al-Qaeda videos, the quality of the videos themselves is quite poor, making the video have 
significantly less “watchability.” Before upgrading its media efforts, ISIS’ popularity was limited 
mostly to its territorial boundaries
 
Figure 4: Type of Cyber-Resources: Al Qaeda and ISIS435 
 
 
By 2014, however, this all changed. “The Expedition of the Prisoners #1” is a far cry from 
what ISIS began to produce after splitting from al-Qaeda. One of ISIS’ most popular video series 
was “Windows Upon the Land of Epic Battles.” As a Brookings Study describes, “The production 
quality of the series is top notch. The videos no longer contain mashups of borrowed footage but 
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are made up of 100% original material filmed by ISIS.”436 Taking a comparative lens to ISIS and 
al-Qaeda propaganda gives a better sense of why ISIS was able to amass such a significant 
following in both Iraq, Syria, and even abroad. While al-Qaeda was the first to weaponize 
propaganda, they were slow to develop with the ever-changing media landscape. 
One may argue that, because many of al-Qaeda’s videos are older, they simply reflect the 
technological abilities of the time. This argument would suggest that, if one compares a 
contemporary al-Qaeda video to a contemporary ISIS video, the quality and content of the videos 
would be similar. However, there are a few points that undermine such logic. First, as demonstrated 
by Figure 5, al-Qaeda simply produced far fewer materials after 2014 than ISIS produced. In some 
cases, al-Qaeda was not even active online in any major sense. Secondly, as was evident from 
Figure 4, al-Qaeda failed to expand significantly on more novel forms of media, such as social 
media. Al-Qaeda’s methods of communication mostly consist of videos and websites, which are 
far less interactive. Not to mention, by failing to utilize social media, al-Qaeda cut itself off from 
younger demographics—exactly the age group that a militant group would want to target. Thus, 
while al-Qaeda may have inspired ISIS’ weaponization of social media, it is likely that ISIS’ use 
of social media is another entity altogether. 
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 Given ISIS’ profuse usage of social media, it begs the question of how extensive ISIS’ 
social media operations are. Indeed, the actual number of ISIS Twitter accounts is a topic of great 
interest to many scholars. As of September 2014, a study by The Recorded Future Internet security 
team found 60,000 pro-ISIS Twitter accounts.438 In March 2015, a Brookings study recorded a 
similar number of pro-ISIS Twitter accounts.439 
However, work by J.M. Berger and Heather Perez through the George Washington 
University’s Program on Extremism heavily curtailed such estimates. As Berger and Perez found, 
the vast majority of ISIS accounts were duplicates—a strategy utilized to avoid the devastation of 
account suspension.440 A later study by Berger and Morgan found that while there were likely 
90,000 detected ISIS accounts on Twitter, only 46,000 were overt ISIS supporters.441 Moreover, 
as Berger and Morgan note, “Much of ISIS’s social media success can be attributed to a relatively 
small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts, which tweet in 
concentrated bursts of high volume.”442 In essence, Berger and Morgan’s work dramatically 
reconceptualized the notion of ISIS’ Twitter apparatus from a vast, grassroots network of active 
users to a centralized, well-planned schemata. 
 In order to ensure a cohesive message on its social media platforms, ISIS centralizes its 
media operations. Though thousands of jihadists participate in ISIS’ media network, the network 
is controlled by one key figure, the group’s head of media relations. This position was formerly 
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held by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, but, after al-Adnani was killed by an airstrike in 2016, the 
position was filled by Abu Hassan al-Muahjir.443 Those in charge of media operations are given 
the title of amir (prince)—a title also given to ISIS commanders on the battlefield—thus 
demonstrating extremely high status which media operations hold within the Islamic State 
apparatus.444 A Washington Post article, which interviewed hundreds of videographers, producers, 
and editors responsible for ISIS’ media operations, found that such media operatives “form a 
privileged, professional class with status, salaries, and living arrangements that are the envy of 
ordinary fighters.”445 Moreover, these media operatives are no novices; ISIS employs experienced 
filmmakers and technicians who are trained extensively before they begin working for the Islamic 
State.446 In the ISIS hierarchy, media operations are clearly central. This allows for the actual 
content produced to fall in line with the views and strategies of high-ranking ISIS members. While 
there may be many ISIS members operating online, there is a clear authority structure to approve 
and distribute content throughout the ISIS ranks. 
Centralization of media content is also fueled by the authority of one main media center: 
Diwan al-’l’lam al-Markazi (the Central Media Office). Currently, it is unknown where al-
Markazi is located, but it is thought to be somewhere in the Euphrates Valley.447 The hierarchical 
nature of al-Markazi is particularly evident in the insignias present in all regional productions, as 
demonstrated by Figure 6. While each video can have a provincial nomenclature, the videos always 
references back to their “parent” media organization, al-Markazi. Thus, each regional media office 
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is afforded enough autonomy to produce content against their individual “near enemy” targets, 
while still maintaining the overall ISIS branding. It is quite an adept media strategy. 
 






 ISIS uses many different operational tactics to distribute its propaganda through social 
media. On Twitter, the group particularly uses hashtag campaigns to promote engagement with 
their accounts. For instance, an Atlantic study found that, “the group enlists hundreds and 
sometimes thousands of activists to repetitively tweet hashtags at certain times of day so that they 
trend on the social network.”449 Moreover, ISIS attempts to get its hashtags trending on streams 
like @ActiveHashtags, an account that tweets each day’s trending hashtags. When a tag becomes 
part of @ActiveHashtags, it results in roughly seventy-two retweets per tweet, a feat that makes 
the hashtag trend even more.450 ISIS also hijacks popular hashtags. In 2014, ISIS took over 
 
448 Ibid. 





hashtags for the 2014 World Cup.451 By manipulating Twitter’s own algorithms, ISIS grows its 
reach and popularizes its brand.  
 Twitter began an ISIS account suspension campaign in mid-2014 to mitigate ISIS’ ability 
to utilize Twitter as a platform to spread propaganda. However, the utility of such suspension is 
widely debated. As J.M. Berger notes, to some degree, the suspensions “reduce the organization’s 
ability to manipulate public opinion and attract recruits.”452 However, suspension is somewhat like 
a game of whack-a-mole—many of the accounts that are shut down simply reappear under 
different names. Moreover, suspension can lead to further isolation of alienated individuals, which 
may further radicalize potential ISIS recruits. At this point, it is unclear as to how effective the 
suspension of accounts is in the larger field of counterterrorism prevention measures. 
ISIS even came up with a specific strategy to cope with Twitter’s suspension campaign. 
As Figure 7 demonstrates, ISIS members are even instructed to follow specific accounts that help 
ISIS members whose accounts have been deactivated. The process is explained in a step-by-step 
format, as shown by Figure 7, and demonstrates how to ensure that ISIS followers maintain the 
same network of followers. This is particularly significant as it allows for ISIS members to 
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Figure 7453: Instructions for Reverse Shoutouts 
 
 
 Twitter suspensions can only go so far, given that, in addition to its efforts on Twitter, ISIS 
uses other forms of social media to market its content. ISIS makes use of encrypted applications 
such as Telegraph, Whatsapp, and Zello. On these applications, ISIS members can share videos, 
photos, texts, and audio messages from their mobile phones for free. For example, Zello is “quite 
popular among ISIS’s younger audiences” and, in 2016, was recorded to have been “repurposed 
by ISIS as a simple how-to guide for pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi.”454 Given that studies 
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demonstrate that young, foreign fighters are often not directly recruited—they, rather, seek out the 
organization—these commonly used mobile applications allow for the fighters to come to ISIS.455  
Other ISIS media usage employs the services of apps to distribute propaganda. In April 
2014, ISIS even emerged with its own app for Android phones, Fajr al-Bashaa’ir (Dawn of Good 
Tidings).456 As of June, 2014, the app was banned from the GooglePlay app store, but already 
allowed for ISIS members to easily reshare al-Markazi content thousands of times.457 The app 
collects a significant amount of personal data and, as a specialist on ISIS’ social media, J.M. Berger 
narrates: 
Once you sign up, the app will post tweets to your account—the content of which is decided by 
someone in ISIS’s social-media operation. The tweets include links, hashtags, and images, and the 
same content is also tweeted by the accounts of everyone else who has signed up for the app, spaced 
out to avoid triggering Twitter’s spam-detection algorithms. Your Twitter account functions 
normally the rest of the time, allowing you to go about your business.458 
 
In other words, the app allows ISIS members to share ISIS content effortlessly. Like ISIS’ use of 
hashtags, Fajr al-Bashaa’ir finds loopholes in Twitter’s algorithms to popularize its content. 
Additionally, given that the app requires an abundance of personal data, it is highly possible that 
ISIS uses such information to its own advantage—whether that be to create registries of potential 
recruits or to better inform its own social media outreach strategy. In any case, J.M. Berger is spot 
on when he boldly declares that ISIS “owes a lot of that support to a calculated campaign that 
would put American social-media-marketing gurus to shame.”459 
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Virtual Target Practice 
 The prerogative of ISIS’ media campaign appears to be three-fold: terrorize its enemies, 
legitimize its message, and support its operations. Figure 8 visualizes the data from an in-depth 
2018 study on the content of ISIS propaganda. As the figure demonstrates, the primary purpose 
behind ISIS’ content is creating fear and threat. This is followed by justifying and supporting their 
actions. Through this motivational analysis, it becomes clear that ISIS specifically uses violence 
as a form of legitimacy. Moreover, ISIS is just as concerned, if not more concerned, with how its 
enemies view ISIS’ acts as ISIS is concerned with how potential recruits view ISIS. 
 
Figure 8460: ISIS’ Motives Behind Cyberterrorism 
 
 
 ISIS’ motivations for its media content have major implications for the content it produces. 
The same 2018 study found that the most recurrent content in ISIS’ propaganda was beheadings. 
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Using the framework of ISIS’ motivations, it becomes clear that ISIS uses beheadings, a form of 
ultra-violence, both to spread fear and to recruit. 
 In some ways, fear can be utilized as a strategy of deterrence. While, to a more peaceable 
individual, this conception is perhaps difficult to understand, an example of this helps to explain 
how fear operates. One video published in July 2015 shows two men, Bashir Abduladhim al-Saado 
and Faisal Hussain, accused of spying on ISIS.461 The video depicts al-Saado and Hussain being 
“tied to wooden posts and shot through the head with pistols at point-blank range by two ISIS 
gunmen. The camera lingers on their corpses and even captures the sound of blood dripping from 
their head wounds”462 The filmography of the video begs the questions of why the men are so 
brutally murdered and why ISIS finds it beneficial to show such violence on film. Yet, it is 
important to understand that fear is a tool that greatly reduces the likelihood of rebellion against 
ISIS’ authority; by utilizing fear, ISIS ensures compliance of its fighters and of the people residing 
in the territory that ISIS holds.  
 Moreover, fear can be utilized to reinforce ISIS’ sectarian messaging. By combining fear 
with the “us vs. them” dichotomy, individuals are terrorized into choosing the “us” categorization 
out of sheer self-preservation. For example, in ISIS’ most popular film titled “Saleel al-Sawarim” 
(“Clanging of the Swords,”), ISIS operatives called “Sahwat Hunters” raid the home of an 
Awakening commander. The video continues as follows: “Two young boys, the sons of a Sahwa 
commander, are digging a giant pit in the dirt. They explain that their father convinced them to 
work with Iraqi government. Then it is their father’s turn to dig...He addresses the camera, advising 
everyone in the Awakening to repent. ‘I am now digging my own grave,’ he says.”463 Like the 
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video of the ISIS “spies,” the message of this video is clear: Don’t affiliate yourself with the 
enemies of ISIS. Indeed, fear is a powerful weapon in the war of takfirism. 
 Yet, as earlier suggested, violence can also be a recruitment tool. In one respect, the abject 
violence on a human form serves to dehumanize the individual, as argued in a 2017 study, The 
Communication of Horrorism.464 When viewed in mass, ISIS videos serve an overt dehumanizing 
message against their victims, convincing impressionable viewers that anyone who disagrees with 
ISIS is lesser-than ISIS members. Yet, even more than persuading viewers to look down upon the 
Shi’a, liberal Sunnis, Christians, Jews, and other “heretics,” the violence itself may attract viewers. 
As one study of ISIS propaganda notes, “for all the disgust that scenes of graphic violence elicit, 
audiences are drawn to watch them because of the stimulation and curiosity they arouse.”465 This 
would certainly explain why, in the days immediately after its release, around 1.2 million people 
in Great Britain had watched the video of James Foley being beheaded.466 In essence, ISIS is able 
to use violence to attract attention. Violence draws viewers in, and, for some, the videos even are 
able to convince the viewer that the violence is justified against the “heretics.” 
 In addition to spreading violence, it is quite significant that ISIS uses its videos to justify 
and support its own messaging given that ISIS remains in battle for legitimacy with other jihadist 
organizations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the major themes that ISIS stresses in its videos is 
the legitimacy of its caliphate—a feature that sets it apart from other jihadist organizations. 
Throughout its media, ISIS refuses to refer to Iraq and Syria as Iraq or Syria, calling their territory 
al-Sham instead, a reference to the ancient Muslim territory that encompassed most of the northern 
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Levant. The symbolism is not lost on many Muslims, nor on many scholars of the region. “Iraq 
and Syria were the cradles of the first Muslim empires, the birthplaces of many of God’s prophets, 
and the grounds of End Times events foretold by Muhammad. These symbols are used as 
ammunition for ISIS to promote its ideology and gain legitimacy among conservative Muslims,” 
argue Hassan and Weiss. Indeed, eighty-one percent of ISIS’ content is thought to have originated 
in Iraq and Syria.467 Even Muslims who disagree with the messages of ISIS are forced to contend 
with ISIS’ narrative of Islamic legitimacy. ISIS’ narrative of holding a Caliphate over religiously 
sanctioned land pressures groups like al-Qaeda to either declare ISIS as shirk or to admit their own 
inferiority. 
 Whether one believes ISIS to be religiously credible or not, it is undeniable that strands of 
Islamic arguments run through ISIS propaganda. Moreover, as this chapter has made clear, ISIS 
prioritizes its media operations on the same level as its physical attacks. Of great concern, is the 
fact that, while physical attacks can only occur in isolation, social media allows for the permeation 
of ideas far beyond the initial release of propaganda. As every parent now must advice their young 












“We are losing the battle.” 
- Michael Steinbach, FBI Assistant Director on the war against ISIS propaganda 
 
 For nearly two decades now, it has been quite apparent that both al-Qaeda and ISIS’ 
media operations are profound. Both al-Qaeda and ISIS used and continue to use media to 
indoctrinate impressionable viewers, legitimize their organization, and instruct their followers on 
how to plan attacks. ISIS’ use of social media only furthers a trend that al-Qaeda began. 
However, as the U.S. was unable to combat al-Qaeda’s media apparatus, it still seems 
unlikely that U.S. officials will be able to robustly address the media empire that ISIS now holds. 
As one U.S. Department of State official, who prefers to remain anonymous, told the author, 
“We need to go beyond saying, ‘ISIS is bad’. And that’s all we’re currently saying.” Indeed, 
despite its valiant attempts, the State Department’s current campaign against ISIS propaganda, 
Think Again Turn Away, fails to go beyond “ISIS is bad.”468  
In fact, current counter-propaganda efforts fall directly into the narrative trap of “us vs. 
them” that al-Qaeda and ISIS both utilize in their own propaganda. Complete with shots of 
beheadings, executions, and other grotesque forms of violence, the propaganda released by the 
State Department directly mirrors that of al-Qaeda and ISIS. These videos do more to foster hate 
against the enemy than they do to shore up the reputation of one’s own brand. 
 The other challenge that Think Again Turn Away faced was the sheer amount of 
propaganda being created by ISIS on a daily basis. There are only so many Twitter monitors for 
English-language accounts, let alone accounts in other languages. Given ISIS’ global reach, this 
is particularly problematic, as content can circulate for days before being flagged or taken down. 
 





Moreover, ISIS’ many regional offices allow for a multitude of content sources. Think Again 
Turn Away, at least initially, only employed fifteen operators and editors.469 
In the first year after its formation, Think Again Turn Away’s Twitter account posted 
more than 1,900 tweets to keep up with ISIS’ constant propaganda. Unfortunately for the State 
Department’s campaign, the account only had 7,300 followers—a meager number if an account 
hopes to go viral. The author certainly concurs with the title of a TIME magazine article; in both 
content and impact, “The State Department’s Twitter War with ISIS is Embarrassing.”470 
 There is some hope. As scholarship increasingly addresses the extent to which al-Qaeda 
and ISIS utilize media as an offensive strategy, academics are beginning to theorize new ways to 
curb ISIS recruitment. Most of these strategies involve engaging with the American Muslim 
community. For instance, a study presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Internet 
Researchers in 2015 suggested that “it would be most effective for the U.S. to establish its own 
positive narrative with regard to ISIS rather than simply focusing on its own counter-narrative. 
This positive narrative does not need to address the same issues as the ISIS narrative; instead, it 
could focus on the reasons why American Muslims do not need to join a militant group in the 
Middle East.”471 Or, as another paper argues, utilizing the public-private partnership to create 
content would help to win the “war of propaganda volume” against ISIS.  
 This author is of the opinion that the inherent problem with the U.S.’ counter-messaging 
propaganda is that it simply replicates the binary worldview of ISIS and al-Qaeda; by over-
emphasizing that we are in a war, the U.S. alienates many potential allies in the Muslim 
community. A comprehensive counter-messaging strategy must be positivist—that is, it must be 
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focused on the cultivation of a community rather than the degradation of another. Former 
President Barack Obama fostered this sentiment when he declared: “We are not at war with 
Islam.”472 Yet, counter-messaging needs to go further than the negation of the negative; counter-
messaging efforts in themselves need to inspire. 
 Finally, though more challenging, the historical purview provided by this paper makes 
clear that both al-Qaeda and ISIS achieve legitimacy through failures of foreign policy. While it 
should go without saying, “good foreign policy” negates terrorist organizations’ ability to foster 
resentment against the West. As U.S. officials look forward at how to combat al-Qaeda and ISIS’ 
propaganda, creating policies that help to build up Middle Eastern communities rather than 
destroy them should be tantamount to none. The challenge posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS’ media 
usage is complex but, by leveraging the strengths of U.S. foreign policy, policy makers can 
support both Middle Easterners’ interests and the U.S.’ own. It must be stressed that “we are not 
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